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In 1994, after a trying wait of 54 years, the New York Rangers
won hockey's Stanley Cup championship. The hometown fans'
jubilation and dreams of a repeat performance were short-lived,
however, when an owners' lockout delayed the start of the
1994-95 season. The season finally started sixteen weeks late,
and the Rangers never recovered from the delay, as they
stumbled into the playoffs and failed to defend their title.'
In 1996, after an eighteen year absence from the fall classic, the
New York Yankees returned to the World Series in dramatic
fashion, coming back from a 2-0 deficit to beat the Atlanta
Braves in six games. For the first time in months, the game of
baseball preempted the sport's labor problems. By mid-
December, the owners and players finally agreed on a new
collective bargaining agreement, and baseball started down the
road to repairing the damage done by the 1994 strike.2
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1. See The Champions: Rangers Excited About Long-Awaited Ring Ceremony,
SAN FRANcisco CHRON., Jan. 12, 1995, at B2 (describing the Rangers' reaction to a long-
awaited agreement between the NHL Players' Association and the team owners). The
hockey season, which usually starts during the first week of October, was shortened from
82 games to 48, with the first games delayed until the third week in January.
The Rangers eventually lost to the Philadelphia Flyers in four straight games in the
second round of the Stanley Cup playoffs. See Terry Egan, Flyers End Rangers' Reign,
4-1, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 27, 1995, at 8B.
2. See Dave Van Dyck, Yanks Rule World Again, C-I. SuN-TIMES, Oct. 27, 1996, at 1
(reporting the Yankees' 1996 World Series win). Major League Baseball also had labor
problems in 1972, 1981 and 1995. See GEOFFREY C. WARD & KEN BURNS, BASEBALL: AN
U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 1:1
In its July 1996 decision, Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.,3 the Supreme
Court held that when parties reach an impasse during collective
bargaining, management may unilaterally implement its "last offer" to the
union without exposing itself to any antitrust liability.4 This non-statutory
labor exemption from antitrust laws has provided management with a
seemingly inequitable advantage over the players' union in the process of
collective bargaining.
The court in Brown III held that the non-statutory exemption from
antitrust laws continues as long as the parties are involved in a collective
bargaining relationship.5 However, the Supreme Court was not asked to
define an endpoint for this relationship, and, accordingly, did not address
the question of whether the non-statutory exemption from antitrust liability
would survive a collapse of the collective bargaining relationship, nor
define such a collapse (e.g., an extremely long impasse accompanied by
management instability, or union decertification).
This comment argues that Brown III provides players and owners
with adequate advice regarding what collective bargaining strategies to
adopt and when the owners might be subject to antitrust liability. Part I
addresses the development of antitrust law and its application to sports,
including the development of baseball's enigmatic antitrust exemption.6
Part II details the exemptions to antitrust liability and tracks the
development of a standard of expiration for the non-statutory exemption.
Part III discusses the impact of union decertification on the players' ability
to gain access to antitrust remedies.8 Part IV analyzes the Supreme Court's
Brown III holding, and argues that the holding does not change the
previously developed expiration standard.9 Part V provides suggestions for
the owners and players once impasse has been reached in negotiations,'0
and Part VI describes why some judicial venues are more favorable to the
parties than others." Finally, Part VII contains a brief summary of the
ILLUSTRATED HISTORY 423-26, 447 (1994); Hal Bodley, Baseball Back to Reality: Labor
Accord Needed to Sustain Momentum, USA TODAY, Nov. 1, 1995, at 3C (describing the
need for a labor agreement between owners and players). Baseball's labor problems of the
past few years were given a four year continuance in early December. See, e.g., Baseball
Gets Peace Until 2000, FLA. TODAY, Dec. 6, 1996, at IC (reporting the unanimous labor
agreement between players and owners).
3. 116 S. Ct. 2116 (1996) [hereinafter Brown III], aff'g 50 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
[hereinafter Brown Ill, rev'g 782 F. Supp. 125 (D.D.C. 1991) [hereinafter Brown 1].
4. See Brown 11, 116 S. Ct. at2121.
5. See id. at 2127.
6. See infra notes 13-122 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 123-76 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 177-203 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 204-22 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 223-32 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 233-42 and accompanying text.
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current status of collective bargaining agreements between the leagues and
their respective players. 2
I. THE HISTORY OF ANTITRUST LAW AND iTS APPLICATION TO SPORTS 3
In the sports industry, most of the friction between players and
owners stems from disagreements over compensation and free agency.14
Generally, antitrust suits involving sports leagues are player-instituted
challenges that assail a specific management practice as an unfair restraint
on competition among teams for player services, in violation of the
Sherman Antitrust Act. 5 Although other industries lend themselves to
straightforward antitrust evaluation in terms of pro-competitive and anti-
competitive effects, the nature of a self-regulated, cooperative, and yet
competitive, sports league raises the question of whether sports leagues
should be subject to antitrust law at all.6
A. The Shennan Antitrust Act
After the Civil War, American industry was dominated by
monopolies. 7 In response to strong anti-business sentiment in his home
state of Ohio, Senator John Sherman led the charge against these trusts. In
his impassioned remarks supporting his antitrust legislation, Sherman
filibustered about the importance of free trade and the production of goods
and commodities, claiming that dangerous business combinations existed
in all reaches of the country, and "if we will not endure a king as a political
12. See infra notes 243-54 and accompanying text.
13. For purposes of this comment, the major professional sports leagues are
abbreviated as follows: Major League Baseball-MLB; Major League Soccer-MLS;
National Basketball Association-NBA; National Football League-NFL; and National
Hockey League-NHL.
14. Courts have heard many cases where players assailed a management practice that
restricted their ability to move freely between teams. See, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S.
258 (1972), affg 443 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1971) (challenging baseball's reserve clause);
Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953), affg per curiam 200 F.2d 198
(9th Cir. 1952), affig 101 F. Supp. 93 (S.D. Cal. 1951) (same); Federal Baseball Club of
Baltimore v. National League of Prof'l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922), aff'g 269 F.
681 (D.C. Cir. 1920) (same); Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977) (challenging football's Plan B free agency restrictions).
There have also been many challenges to league-imposed compensation restrictions. See,
e.g., Brown III, 116 S. Ct. at 2116 (challenging football's practice squad salary cap).
15. See John C. Weistart, Judicial Review of Labor Agreements: Lessons from the
Sports Industry, 44 LAw & CoNTEM. PROBS. 109, 110 (1981).
16. See Michael J. Kaplan, Annotation, Application of Federal Antitrust Laws to
Professional Sports, 18 A.L.R. FED. 489, 493 (1992).
17. See William L. Letwin, Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887-1890,
23 U. Cmu. L. REv. 221, 228-31, 234-35 (1956).
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power we should not endure a king over the production, transportation, and
sale of any of the [necessities] of life." 8
The final text of the Sherman Antitrust Act, enacted on July 2, 1890,
provided:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States... is declared to be illegal.... Every person who shall
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States... shall be deemed
guilty of a felony .... 9
To this day, the Sherman Act remains one of the most dangerous obstacles
to monopolies and their business activities.
Over the last century, courts have constructed an elaborate framework
to determine whether a monopoly's actions violate the Sherman Act.
Initially, courts evaluated antitrust challenges facially, declaring the
assailed practices per se violations when the conduct was so unjust that it
was a "naked restraint" with no other purpose than to stifle competition.'
Examples of such naked restraints include price fixing to eliminate
competitors,2 ' territorial exclusion/division of markets," group boycotts,n
tie-in arrangements ' (such as pre-season ticket purchasing requirements),
and vertical territorial restrictions."
In 1911, the Supreme Court determined that some combinations and
conspiracies in restraint of trade were not illegal restrictions of interstate
commerce.2 Presented with the question of whether certain petroleum
price fixing and collusive production and shipping practices were illegal
restraints of trade, the Court held that only unreasonable restraints of trade
were illegal under the Sherman Act.2' Thereafter, two standards of
analysis for antitrust liability developed: (1) whether the conduct was per
se illegal, or (2) whether the conduct violated the Rule of Reason (as
articulated in Standard Oil):
[TJudgment must in every case be called into play in order to
18. 21 CONG. REc. 2455, 2457 (1890).
19. Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1996).
20. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (finding
"preferential routing" clauses in land sale and lease agreements to be unlawful trade
restraints).
21. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940).
22. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609-10 (1972).
23. See, e.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959).
24. See, e.g., International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 398 (1947).
25. See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 372-73 (1967).
26. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 32-43 (1911).
27. See id. at 55, 59-70.
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determine whether a particular act is embraced within the
statutory classes [of conduct prohibited by the Sherman Act],
and whether, if the act is within such classes, its nature or effect
causes it to be a restraint of trade within the intendment of the
act.2s
With the advent of these two theories of analysis, the courts gradually
shifted to across the board application of the Rule of Reason.29 Thus, many
practices initially deemed per se illegal have been readdressed by modem
courts under Rule of Reason scrutiny. °
The Supreme Court in National Society of Professional Engineers v.
United States3' articulated the most current version of the Rule of Reason
standard: an imposed restraint is unlawful if the anti-competitive injury it
causes outweighs the pro-competitive benefits that it generates. 2 The
Sherman Act does not require a competitive bidding process; rather, the
Act merely prohibits unreasonable restraints on competition. Accordingly,
the proper test for the courts to use is one that balances the equity of the
pro-competitive and anti-competitive effects.33 This equitable approach
seems more appropriate when analyzing antitrust challenges to sports
leagues, due to the symbiotic interaction of teams required within any
league.3'4
28. Id. at 63.
29. The Rule of Reason analysis has been bifurcated into a "quick look" application
and a "full" application. Courts often will employ the "quick look" analysis when the
practice involved is a "naked restraint of trade with no purpose except stifling of
competition," and the court may declare the practice illegal without considering any
competitive justifications for it; however, the court should not apply the "quick look"
analysis where "the economic impact of the restraint is not immediately obvious." Chicago
Prof'l Sports Ltd. Partnership v. NBA, 754 F. Supp. 1336, 1357 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (citation
omitted), aff'd, 961 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1992). When a "quick look" analysis is employed,
the court need not make any "inquiry into market power." Chicago Prof I Sports Ltd.
Partnership v. NBA, 874 F. Supp. 844, 859 (N.D. Ill. 1995), vacated on other grounds,
95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1996).
30. In Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 9,
19-20 & n.33 (1979), the Supreme Court set aside the premise that price fixing is per se
illegal, holding that the implementation of such practices must be analyzed under a Rule of
Reason approach, because circumstances may show that there are pro-competitive effects to
be gained through certain price fixing practices. See also Mackey, 543 F.2d at 620 (finding
that a practice operating contrary to the Rule of Reason violates the Sherman Act).
The Court came to similar conclusions with respect to group boycotts (see Northwest
Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 295-97
(1985)) and territorial restrictions/division of markets (see Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1977)).
31. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
32. See id. at 691.
33. See id. at 695-96.
34. Collegiate drafts, player movement restrictions, salary caps, and mandated revenue
sharing would fail most per se analyses. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
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B. Antitrust and Baseball
Although enacted to protect "the production, transportation, and sale
of any of the [necessities] of life,"35 the Sherman Act did not make all
restraints on trade illegal-only those dealing with matters of interstate
commerce. This distinction between interstate and intrastate commerce
gave courts the leeway needed to grant baseball its first "exemption" from
antitrust scrutiny.36 However, in the intervening decades, both the
interstate and the commerce aspects of sports increased dramatically.37
However, a league is destined for problems when its member teams cannot compete on the
playing field with one another.
The NFL sits on very secure ground because teams can experience a quick turnaround
in on-field performance due to revenue sharing, the salary cap, free agency, and the
collegiate draft. These mechanisms have allowed small-market teams, such as Green Bay,
winner of the 1997 Super Bowl, to compete with big-market teams, such as New York and
Chicago. These "restrictive practices" also enabled expansion franchises in Carolina and
Jacksonville to field playoff teams in their second year in the league, and have allowed
other teams to drastically reverse their on-field misfortunes within a few short years (for
example, Dallas had a 1-15 record in 1991 and won the Super Bowl in 1994).
Meanwhile, MLB has experienced continuing problems with the financial and
competitive security of small-market teams such as those in Pittsburgh, Montreal, and
Kansas City. This is best evidenced by comparing the payrolls of the four finalists in the
1996 playoffs (World Series champion New York Yankees, first in MLB; American League
("AL") runner-up Baltimore Orioles, second; National League ("NL") champion Atlanta
Braves, fourth; and NL runner-up St. Louis Cardinals, fifth) with the payrolls of two of the
last-place teams during the 1996 season (Detroit, last in the AL East, had the fourth lowest
payroll; and Pittsburgh, last in the NL Central, had the second lowest payroll). See Mike
Dodd, Can A Pennant Be Bought? Revenue Disparity Leaves Some Teams in Left Field,
USA TODAY, Oct. 8, 1996, at 1A (reporting that teams with higher payiolls are more
successful); 1996 Major League Baseball Salary Survey, USA TODAY, Nov. 15, 1996,
at 15C. See also What they Paid them to Play, (visited Mar. 19, 1997) <http:ll
www.usatoday.com/sports/baseball/bbw/sbbw3506.htm>; Final Standings, (visited
Mar. 19, 1997) <http://espnet.sportszone.com/mlb/standings/1996>.
Other sports leagues have folded in the last twenty years due to the leagues' inability
to maintain a competitive balance both on the field and on the books. The North American
Soccer League folded in 1985 because only a few of its fourteen teams were financially
viable. The failed teams could not compete with certain teams' financial abilities to
stockpile players with the talent level of Pele and Franz Beckenbauer, as the New York
Cosmos did. See Ridge Mahoney, Lessons Were Learned from Outdoor Soccer's Demise,
SAN DIEGO UNIoN-Twm., Aug. 24, 1985, at D14; Brian Trusdell, Cosmos Weren't Enough
for NASL, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1985, at 9. The United States Football League folded in
1986 for similar reasons. See United States Football League v. NFL, 842 F.2d 1335,
1341-42 (2d Cir. 1988).
35. 21 CONG. REc. at 2457.
36. See Federal Baseball, 259 U.S. at 200. The Supreme Court held that MLB was
exempt from liability under the Sherman Act because it was not involved in interstate
commerce. See infra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
37. See Toolson, 346 U.S. at 359 (Burton, J., dissenting) (arguing that baseball clubs
qualify as interstate trade and commerce); Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402, 407-08 (2d
Cir. 1949) (holding that baseball is interstate commerce), rev'g summary judgment, 79
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Nonetheless, in 1972, the Supreme Court upheld baseball's enigmatic
exemption.38
1. The Reserve Clause and Baseball's Antitrust Exemption/
Exclusion39
The first antitrust challenges to sports league practices involved
baseball's reserve clause.4" Whenever a rival league was created, such as
the American League in 1899,41 the Federal League in 1913,42 and the
Mexican League in 1925,43 some players would "jump" their contracts with
Major League teams in favor of promises of higher salaries. 44 However, a
player who did so violated his Major League contract's reserve clause,
which granted a team the exclusive right to "reserve" that player's services
F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
38. See Flood, 407 U.S. at 258.
39. See Joseph J. McMahon, Jr. & John P. Rossi, A History and Analysis of Baseball's
Three Antitrust Exemptions, 2 ViiL. SPORTS & ENT. L.F. 213, 214-15 & nn.13-14 (1995)
(arguing that baseball is not exempt from the Sherman Act, but rather is excluded because
the courts do not consider baseball to be interstate commerce).
40. After the Civil War, baseball club teams would recruit "ringers" and outbid other
teams for more talented players. See HAROLD SEYMOUR, BASEBALL: THE EARLY YEARS
47-48 (1960) [hereinafter SEYMOUR, EARLY YEARS]; Joseph A. Kohm, Jr., Baseball's
Antitrust Exemption: It's Going, Going... Gone!, 20 NOvA L. REv. 1231, 1233 (1996).
In 1879, in response to this practice, the owners devised the reserve system, whereby a team
could reserve five of its players for the team's exclusive control. See JAMES B. DWORKJN,
OwNERS VERSUS PLAYERS: BASEBALL AND COLLECIVE BARGAINING 44 (1981); SEYMOUR,
EARLY YEARS, supra, at 82. The reserve system evolved to include full roster protection.
Ultimately, the players were unable to receive salaries commensurate with their true market
values. See DWORKIN, supra, at 46.
41. Ban Johnson took over the struggling Western League in 1893, and in 1899,
changed its name to the American League. After the 1900 season, Johnson "established
new clubs in Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Washington, snapped up newly
unemployed players, then [raided] active National League rosters .... Lured by offers of
an average of $500 more per season, 111 National Leaguers jumped to [the] American
League." WARD & BURNS, supra note 2, at 65.
42. The Federal League started in 1913 as a minor league. See id. at 121. After one
season, the Federal League began "offering big money to big-league stars.... Eighty-one
former major leaguers... [and] eighteen men actually under contract" were lured to the
new league. Id.
43. The Mexican League was founded as a semi-professional league in 1925. See
Gerald F. Vaughn, Jorge Pasquel and the Evolution of the Mexican League, 12 NATIONAL
PASTIME 9, 9 (1992). In 1946, the Mexican League "wooed top U.S. players to come to
Mexico, drawing the wrath of major league club owners. During 1946 and 1947 about
one-fifth of the Mexican League's 150 or more players had served in the U.S. major leagues
or high minors." Id. at 12. Of these thirty or so players, eighteen were under contract to
major league clubs. See WARD & BURNS, supra note 2, at 353.
44. The reserve clause gave a player's club perpetual rights to his services. Players
would "jump," or violate, these contracts when they signed with another team.
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for the ensuing season.45
In 1914, Hal Chase46 jumped from the Chicago White Sox of the
American League to the Buffalofeds of the Federal League. The White
Sox sued to enjoin Chase from playing for another team and to compel him
to honor his White Sox contract.' Chase unsuccessfully argued that the
reserve clause in his contract violated the Sherman Act because of the
commodifying effect that the clause had on players. The New York
Supreme Court disagreed with Chase's "novel" argument, stating that
although baseball was an "ingeniously devised" monopoly, it was not
"interstate trade or commerce... subject to the provisions of the Sherman
Act."'  Baseball was "an amusement, a sport... not a commodity...
subject to the regulation of Congress on the theory that it is interstate
commerce."49 Although the decision freed Chase from his White Sox
contract under New York contract law," the court's holding and analysis
with respect to antitrust law became the foundation for baseball's
subsequent antitrust exemption.
In 1916, the Baltimore Terrapins of the Federal League sued the
Major League clubs, hoping to have the reserve clause declared illegal and
all existing standard player contracts declared null and void . The D.C.
Court of Appeals overturned the trial court's finding that baseball was
interstate commerce, and that Major League Baseball was involved in an
illegal monopoly,52 holding instead that baseball was not trade or
commerce, but sport. Since baseball was local in its beginning and in its
end, it could not be "transferred in interstate commerce."" Justice Holmes
affirmed the appellate court, holding that the "business is giving
45. See Kohm, supra note 40, at 1234 n.19 (quoting LIONEL S. SOBEL, PROFESSIONAL
SPORTS & THE LAW § 2.1 (1977)).
46. Although Hal Chase was an elite player during his career, he holds a special place
in baseball history for other reasons. Chase was better known for his jump to the Federal
League, and, upon his return to MLB, for his role in the Chicago "Black Sox' scandal.
Chase participated in fixing the 1919 World Series, which earned eight other players
lifetime bans from the sport. See generally ELIOT AsINOF, EIGHT MEN OUT 14-15, 28
(1963); HAROLD SEYMOUR, BASEBALL: THE GOLDEN AGE 288-93 (1971) [hereinafter
SEYMOUR, GOLDEN AGE].
47. See American League Baseball Club of Chicago v. Chase, 149 N.Y.S. 6 (1914).
48. Id. at 16.
49. Id. at 17.
50. "The court will not assist in enforcing an agreement which is a part of a general
plan ... of monopoly." Id. at 20.
51. The clubs in the Federal League brought such an action before future MLB
commissioner Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis in 1915, but they settled with the Major
League clubs while Landis delayed returning a verdict. See SEYMOUR, GOLDEN AGE, supra
note 46, at 212. Baltimore did not join in the settlement and subsequently sued MLB on its
own. See Federal Baseball, 259 U.S. at 200.
52. See Federal Baseball, 269 F. at 684.
53. Id. at 685.
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exhibitions of [baseball], which are purely state affairs... the transport is
a mere incident, not the essential thing.... [P]ersonal effort, not related to
production, is not a subject of commerce." 4 Furthermore, in 1953, the
Supreme Court in the Toolson case construed their 1922 Federal Baseball
decision as exempting baseball from the Sherman Act, although Federal
55Baseball had only stated that baseball was not interstate commerce.
The next antitrust challenge to baseball's "exemption" involved
several players whom MLB blacklisted when they jumped their Major
League contracts to play in the Mexican League in 1946. When the
Mexican League collapsed, the players sued the Commissioner on antitrust
grounds over his decision to blacklist them. The trial court granted the
Commissioner summary judgment on the basis of Federal Baseball.56 A
divided Second Circuit overturned the decision.7 Judge Learned Hand
wrote that the interstate character of baseball was so prevalent, it was akin
to "a 'ball park' where a state line ran between the diamond and the
grandstand." 8 Concurring, Judge Frank wrote that Federal Baseball was
not fatal to the plaintiff ballplayers since subsequent courts' expansion of
the Commerce Clause had rendered Federal Baseball an "impotent zombi
[sic], '9 and the Supreme Court had overruled many of the cases used as
precedent to support Federal Baseballf" Therefore, the courts should
consider baseball an interstate activity, and commerce could include a
laborer's services-"only the totalitarian-minded will believe that [the
players' high salaries] excuse[] virtual slavery."6'
The case was remanded for trial, but it settled before the court could
explicitly overrule Federal Baseball.2  However, a few years later,
"perhaps encouraged by... Gardella,"3 George Toolson filed an antitrust
54. Federal Baseball, 259 U.S. at 208-09.
55. See Toolson, 346 U.S. at 356-57.
There has been much speculation regarding the propriety of the Federal Baseball
decision. Justice Taft's family owned a baseball team when the Court heard the case, and
Taft himself had been considered as a candidate for the Commissioner of baseball. See LEE
LOWENFISH, THE IMPERFEcT DIAMOND: A HISTORY OF BASEBALL'S LABOR WARS 98 (rev.
ed. 1991). Contemporaneous notes surfaced that implied that Taft should have recused
himself from the case, and that without his presence and coalition building, the Federal
Baseball verdict could have been 4-4 instead of 9-0. W. Buckley Briggs, Remarks at the
University of Pennsylvania Law School (Oct. 9, 1996).
56. See Gardella, 79 F. Supp. at 263.
57. See Gardella, 172 F.2d at 404.
58. Id. at 407.
59. Id. at 408-09.
60. See id. at 409 n.1.
61. Id. at 410, 412.
62. See Kohm, supra note 40, at 1237-38.
63. Id. at 1238.
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suit against the New York Yankees, challenging the reserve clausei4 In
one of the most ferociously disputed per curiam affirmations ever, the
Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment for the Yankees, by a 7-2
vote, "on the authority of Federal Baseball, so far as that decision
determine[d] that Congress had no intention of including the business of
baseball within the scope of the federal antitrust laws."6' This was the first
time that the Supreme Court mentioned an actual antitrust "exemption" for
baseball. Furthermore, the Court thus implied that result stare decisis
should govern, and if the precedential value of Federal Baseball was
incorrect, Congress should legislate any necessary changes. 67 This often
has been viewed as an overreaching interpretation of Federal Baseball
because Federal Baseball does not grant baseball a per se exemption from
the Sherman Act; it merely states that because baseball was not interstate
commerce in 1922, it did not fall within the purview of the Act. Two
justices dissented in Toolson on the grounds that Federal Baseball only
stood for the proposition that if baseball is not interstate, then it is not
subject to the Sherman Act. The dissent suggested that if Congress had
intended specifically to exempt baseball from the purview of the Sherman
Act, it should have done so explicitly. 9
Baseball's antitrust "exemption" remained unchallenged until 1972
when Curt Flood, an outfielder for the St. Louis Cardinals, objected to
being traded to the Philadelphia Phillies. Flood sued the Commissioner,
claiming that the reserve clause violated the Sherman Act and that MLB
should grant him free agency-the ability to negotiate a contract with any
64. Toolson was playing for the Yankees' Class AAA minor league team in Newark
when his contract was assigned to Binghamton (the Yankees' Class AA minor league team).
Toolson failed to report to Binghamton, but, under the reserve clause, he was vertically
locked into the Yankees' minor league system, such that he could not play elsewhere. He
filed an antitrust challenge to the minor league reserve system, claiming that it violated the
Sherman Act. Toolson argued unsuccessfully at the trial and appellate levels that Gardella
required the reserve clause to be analyzed under the Rule of Reason for antitrust liability.
See Toolson, 101 F. Supp. at 94.
65. Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357.
66. The American courts' system of precedent or stare decisis is based on:
adherence to both the reasoning and result of a case, and not simply to the result
alone. This distinguishes the American system of precedent, sometimes called
"rule stare decisis," from the English system, which historically has been
limited to following the results or disposition based on the facts of a case and
thus referred to as "result stare decisis."
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 692 (3d Cir. 1991), aff'd
in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); see also Piazza v. MLB,
831 F. Supp. 420,437-38 (E.D. Pa. 1993)(same).
67. See Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357.
68. See id. at 360 (Burton, J., dissenting).
69. See id. at 364-65 (Burton, J., dissenting).
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team."
Both the district court and the court of appeals entered judgments
against Flood on the basis of Federal Baseball and Toolson.7 Writing for
a divided Supreme Court,72 Justice Blackmun affirmed the lower courts,
although he admitted that "baseball is a business and it is engaged in
interstate commerce."73  However, Blackmun then stated that the
"established aberration" of baseball's antitrust exemption, though
"unrealistic, inconsistent, or illogical," had been present for fifty years, and
Congress' inaction supported the Court's decision to keep it intact.74
Justice Marshall wrote a scathing dissent, wherein he scolded the Court for
its mechanical application of stare decisis to the Federal Baseball and
Toolson decisions.75 Both Marshall's and Douglas' dissenting opinions
argued that the Court gave too much weight to the purported congressional
inaction with respect to baseball's exemption.76 Justice Marshall stated
that baseball "should be covered by the antitrust laws beginning with this
case and henceforth, unless Congress decides otherwise." 'n
70. See Flood, 407 U.S. at 264-66. Flood had the support of at least one Supreme
Court justice, retired Justice Arthur Goldberg, who represented him in his reserve clause
challenge. See id. at 258.
71. See Flood, 316 F. Supp. at 276-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Flood, 443 F.2d at 265-66.
72. The Supreme Court voted 5-3 to affirm the appellate court's decision. See Flood,
407 U.S. at 259, 285, 288.
73. Id. at 282. Based on a literal reading of Federal Baseball, baseball was not subject
to the Sherman Act because it was not interstate commerce. Here, Blackmun admits that
baseball is interstate commerce, so arguably, the reserve clause should be subject to a Rule
of Reason analysis. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
74. Flood, 407 U.S. at 282-83. The Court states that under these circumstances, "there
is merit in consistency even though... beneath that consistency is a layer of
inconsistency." Id. at 284.
75. See id. at 292-93 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Marshall noted that the Court has a
history of changing its view as to the definition of interstate commerce. See id. at 293 n.4;
see also supra note 66.
76. Although Congress has not legislated regarding baseball's exemption, it has not
been for a lack of effort. Since 1949, baseball's exemption has been the subject of
numerous Congressional investigations and hearings, but unfortunately, legislative action
has been derailed by predominantly partisan testimony on behalf of both sides. See
generally STEPHEN R. LowE, THE KID ON THE SANDLOT: CONGRESS AND PROFESSIONAL
SPORTS, 1910-1992, 15-60 (1995); McMahon, supra note 39, at 248-49. This inaction will
likely change in the near future, since one of the terms of the new MLB collective
bargaining agreement is a required bipartisan effort to overturn baseball's exemption. See
Jim Litke, Baseball Owners on Losing End, DAYTON DAiLY NEws, Nov. 27, 1996, at 6D.
Inferring Congressional intent from any Congressional inaction generally is
problematic. See Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119-20 (1940) (arguing that
attempting to explain the cause of Congressional inaction without any evidence is
unjustified); McMahon, supra note 39, at 249 (same); William D. Neary, Note, Legislation,
32 TEx. L. REv. 890, 891-92 (1954) (discussing possible reasons for Congressional inaction
in Toolson).
77. Flood, 407 U.S. at 293 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also id. at 285-88 (Douglas,
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2. Other Applications of Baseball's Exemption
Although the Court never overruled Federal Baseball, the players
finally obtained free agency in 1976 .7 However, the narrowing of the
exemption in Flood,79 combined with subsequent lower court decisions'
J., dissenting).
Justice Holmes, though responsible for the Federal Baseball opinion that the
Supreme Court has arguably misconstrued to grant baseball an exemption from antitrust
law, once wrote about the dangers of the blind application of result stare decisis:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid
down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon
which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists
from blind imitation of the past.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897). This
quotation makes the Flood outcome even more ironic, because the Flood Court rejected
every premise on which Federal Baseball was based. See Flood, 407 U.S. at 282-85.
78. Until the 1973 collective bargaining agreement, the Commissioner was the final
arbiter of disputes. In the 1973 collective bargaining agreement, the players gained the
right to go to binding, impartial arbitration.
Andy Messersmith and Dave McNally were pitchers for the Los Angeles Dodgers and
Montreal Expos, respectively, who played out their contracts in 1974. They played under
their respective option years in 1975, pursuant to clause 10A in the Major League
Agreement:
If prior to March 1, the Player and the Club have not agreed upon the terms of
the Contract, then on or before 10 days after said March 1, the Club shall have
the right by written notice to the Player to renew this contract for the period of
one year.
BILL JAMES, -STORICAL BASEBALL ABsTRAcT 263 (1988). The clubs attempted to renew
the pitchers' contracts for a second option year, but the players balked, claiming that the
option clause was only for one year, and not in perpetuity. Because the issue was not the
clause's legality (which had been upheld in Flood), but its interpretation, the players'
claims were submitted to an arbitrator.
Arbitrator Peter Seitz held that the option year clause does not create a perpetual
reserve system. A contract must explicitly give the owner the unlimited right to renew.
Seitz held that the option year was for one year only, and Messersmith and McNally were
free agents. See National & American League Prof 1 Baseball Clubs v. Major League
Baseball Players Ass'n (Messersmith and McNally Grievances), 66 Lab. Arb. 101 (1976),
aff'd sub nom. Kansas City Royals v. Major League Baseball Players' Ass'n, 532 F.2d 615
(8th Cir. 1976).
In the 1976 collective bargaining agreement, the players and owners agreed to full
free agency after six years of service time. This provision was still unchanged as of the
1996 collective bargaining agreement. See Litke, supra note 76, at 6D (the only change in
free agency was the elimination of the restriction against filing for free agency twice within
a five-year span if a team offers the player arbitration).
79. The question posed to the Flood Court, as articulated at the beginning of the
Court's opinion, was whether "baseball's reserve system is within the reach of the federal
antitrust laws." Flood, 407 U.S. at 259 (emphasis added). Scholars decrying baseball's
judicially created exemption from the Sherman Act point to this language for the
proposition that the only exemption that baseball enjoys is one for its reserve system.
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and advances made by the players through collective bargaining,"' may
have severely restricted the baseball owners' antitrust immunity.
In another challenge to MLB's antitrust exception, two lower court
cases addressed the proposed purchase of the San Francisco Giants team
and its potential relocation to St. Petersburg.2 Plaintiffs in the two suits
asserted that MLB unreasonably restricted trade in denying the franchise
move, by "unlawfully [restraining and impeding the investors']
opportunities to engage in the business of Major League Baseball." 83 Both
trial courts held that the precedential value of Federal Baseball, Toolson,
and Flood should be restricted to the proposition that only baseball's
reserve system is exempt from the Sherman Act.' This interpretation
contradicts that espoused by the Seventh Circuit in Finley v. Kuhn,85 which
held Flood to extend baseball's reserve exemption to the entire business of
baseball. 6 The Supreme Court has not yet addressed this circuit split, as
the two cases involving the Giants were settled before the interpretation of
the exemption could be appealed.Y
See, e.g., Kohm, supra note 40, at 1240-41, 1249-51; Charles M. Bums, The Scope of
Major League Baseball's Antitrust Exemption, 24 STETsON L. REv. 495, 525, 532-34
(1995); Marc Chalpin, Comment, It Ain't Over 'Til It's Over: The Century Long Conflict
Between the Owners and the Players in Major League Baseball, 60 ALB. L. REV. 205, 213-
14 (1996). But see Joseph P. Bauer, Antitrust and Sports: Must Competition on the Field
Displace Competition in the Marketplace?, 60 TENN. L. REV. 263, 267 n.16 (1993) ("It is
clear that the exemption extends beyond the legality of baseball's reserve system.");
Deborah L. Spander, Comment, The Impact of Piazza on the Baseball Antitrust Exemption,
2 UCLA ENr. L. REV. 113, 120-26 (1995) (observing that the Seventh Circuit found this
interpretation incorrect in Finley v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
876 (1978)).
80. See Piazza, 831 F. Supp. at 420 (denying summary judgment on the authority of
Flood, because the exemption guaranteed to baseball therein is restricted to the reserve
clause); Butterworth v. National League of Prof 1 Baseball Clubs, 644 So.2d 1021
(Fla. 1994) (affirming Piazza).
81. See Bauer, supra note 79, at 266; see also Robert A. McCormick, Baseball's Third
Strike: The Triumph of Collective Bargaining in Professional Baseball, 35 VAND. L. REV.
1131, 1169 (1982).
82. See Piazza, 831 F. Supp. at 421; Butterworth, 644 So.2d at 1022.
The Giants franchise is no stranger to relocation, having moved from New York to
California, along with the Brooklyn Dodgers, in 1958. See MARVIN MILLER, A WHOLE
DIFFERENT BALL GAME: THE SPORT AND BUSINESS OF BASEBALL 49 (1991).
83. Piazza, 831 F. Supp. at 424.
84. See id. at 436; Butterworth, 644 So.2d at 1022. A Texas district court also adopted
this interpretation in Henderson Broadcasting Corp. v. Houston Sports Ass'n, 541 F. Supp.
263, 271-72 (S.D. Tex. 1982), by refusing to extend baseball's antitrust exemption to radio
broadcasting contracts.
85. 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978).
86. See id. at 541.
87. In Piazza, the group offering to purchase the Giants had its ownership application
denied. Two Italian-American investors in that group were angered by what they felt were
the League's insinuations that their "Mafia ties" caused the application to be denied. The
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C. Antitrust Law and Other Entertainment
Although baseball has enjoyed some degree of exemption from
Sherman Act liability, courts have not provided a similar luxury to other
forms of entertainment or even to other sports.
The first case suggesting a distinction between baseball and other
forms of entertainment involved a vaudeville theater owner who claimed
to be exempt from the antitrust laws under the Federal Baseball analysis.88
Although the argument that the defendants presented mirrored the
reasoning employed by the Court in Federal Baseball, Justice Holmes
(again writing for the Court) held that vaudeville was, in fact, subject to
the Sherman Act, because the interstate component was more than
"incidental."89 Similar results were handed down following challenges by
the motion picture industry.'o
Based on the Toolson court's interpretation of interstate commerce,
the Court determined that theatrical productions were not exempt from
antitrust laws." The defendants in Shubert unsuccessfully argued that
theatrical productions were more akin to baseball games, which were "of
two investors sued MLB, alleging that the league violated the Sherman Act by denying their
application. The matter settled on the eve of trial for a $6,000,000 apology. See Burns,
supra note 79, at 536; Michael Bamberger, Baseball Apologizes to Rejected Investors, PHIL.
INQUIRER, Nov. 3, 1994, at D5.
In Butterworth, the court gave the Florida Attorney General the power to start
proceedings against the NL for refusing to allow the Giants to move to Florida. This matter
settled when MLB granted St. Petersburg an expansion franchise, the Tampa-St. Petersburg
Devil Rays, which will begin competing in the AL in 1998. See Bums, supra note 79, at
537-38.
88. See Hart v. B. F. Keith Vaudeville Exch., 262 U.S. 271, 273 (1923).
89. See id. at 274 ("[W]hat in general is incidental, in some instances may rise to a
magnitude that requires it to be considered independently."). This result might be explained
by the fact that a vaudeville troupe arguably has no "home," so there always must be
interstate travel, unlike a baseball team, which has a home territory, so interstate travel is
not always theoretically required. This reasoning would later prove insufficient to provide
other sports entities with similar protection. See infra notes 97-104 and accompanying text.
Interestingly, on remand, the trial court dismissed the action because the government
failed to prove that the interstate character of the vaudeville productions was more than
incidental. This dismissal was upheld by the appellate court. See Hart v. B.F. Keith
Vaudeville Exch., 12 F.2d 341, 343-44 (2d Cir. 1926).
90. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 140-42 (1948); Schine
Chain Theatres v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 116 (1948); United States v. Griffith, 334
U.S. 100, 109 (1948); United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 183-84
(1944); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 230-32 (1939); Binderup v.
Pathe Exch., 263 U.S. 291, 309-11 (1923).
91. See United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222, 227 (1955). Because Toolson
essentially affirmed Federal Baseball through stare decisis, many read Toolson to
incorporate the same analysis of whether certain activities truly constitute "interstate
commerce." See Toolson, 346 U.S. at 356.
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course a local affair,"92 than to notion pictures, which were articles "of
trade... [that move] into interstate commerce like any other manufactured
product. '93 The Court held that both Federal Baseball and Toolson only
stood for the proposition that baseball was exempt from the antitrust laws,
and that to expand that exemption would require legislative action.94
Several other sports organizations have attempted to craft arguments
that analogize their operations to baseball's in such a manner warranting
the antitrust exemption. However, the courts have not accommodated any
of these would-be beneficiaries. For example, in International Boxing
Club v. United States,95  boxing promoters attempted to equate
championship boxing with baseball to make it fit under the protective
canopy of Federal Baseball and, therefore, shield themselves from
antitrust prosecution. The Court disagreed with this analogy, holding that
antitrust laws apply to boxing just as they apply to theatrical productions.96
Thus, the Court stated that there was no general "sports" exemption from
the Sherman Act.
Attempts to analogize football to baseball, as a team sport (and not an
individual sport like boxing), also met with unfavorable results. In 1957, a
NFL player who had jumped to the rival All-American Football
Conference [AAFC] sued the NFL under the Clayton Act for antitrust
violations in the League's action in blacklisting him.97 The appellate court
followed the reasoning behind Toolson and Federal Baseball, and held it
appropriate to afford all team sports the same antitrust exemption as
92. Shubert, 348 U.S. at 227 (citation omitted).
93. Id. at 227 n.9.
94. See id. at 230. But see supra notes 66-81 and infra note 174 and accompanying
text (noting that continued judicial reliance on Congressional inaction as the cornerstone for
decisions that arguably are inconsistent and illogical should be considered with skepticism).
95. 348 U.S. 236 (1955).
96. See id. at 240-44. In his dissent, Justice Minton considered the Court's reasoning
an example of the "tail wagging the dog," as he found no tangible distinction between the
production of baseball games and the production of championship boxing matches. See id.
at 251 (Minton, J., dissenting). Minton's analysis is logical and consistent with the
objective theory that Justices Marshall and Douglas espoused in their Flood dissent.
See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
97. See Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445 (1957), rev'g 231 F.2d 620 (9th Cir. 1956).
William Radovich was an all-pro guard with the NFL's Detroit Lions who wanted to play in
Los Angeles. When his trade requests were not answered by the Lions, he signed with the
Los Angeles Dons of the AAFC. This contract did not violate the NFL's reserve system,
because the AAFC was not subject to NFL policies. However, the NFL blacklisted all
players who jumped their contracts to go to other teams. A NFL farm team had offered
Radovich a contract, but when they learned of the blacklisting, they withdrew the offer.
See id. at 446-47.
The NFL had a reserve system similar in structure to MLB's. Radovich sued to
overturn the reserve system based on the Sherman Act, posing arguments similar to those
proffered by Curt Flood, fifteen years later. See supra notes 70-78 and accompanying text.
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baseball." A divided Supreme Court, however, disagreed. The Court
noted that while football employed several of the same restraints as
baseball, which were shielded from Sherman Act liability, Toolson only
exempted baseball from the antitrust laws. 99 Accordingly, the courts have
denied subsequent requests for antitrust exemptions for other sports,
including basketball,'00 hockey, 1 golf," soccer,'03 and even amateur
softball. 104
D. Applying Antitrust Law to League Practices
In non-exempt sports, three general league practices, other than the
reserve system, have been subjected to antitrust challenges over the years:
veteran free agency,15 the rookie draft,'O° and the salary cap. 7
1. Veteran Free Agency
In 1974, two years after the NFL's 1970 collective bargaining
agreement had expired, no new agreement had been reached, and the
players struck. 8 After the strike, the League continued to unilaterally
implement the "Rozelle Rule," a player-compensation scheme for free
agency."0 A group of players challenged this practice as an "illegal
98. See Radovich, 231 F.2d at 622.
99. See Radovich, 352 U.S. at 449-52 (acknowledging that exempting baseball and not
other team sports was, perhaps, "unrealistic, inconsistent, [and] illogical."). However, the
Court admitted that were a Federal Baseball challenge presented as a case of first
impression, baseball would not receive such an anomalistic exemption. See id.
100. See, e.g., Haywood v. NBA, 401 U.S. 1204, 1205 (1971) (Douglas, Circuit Justice)
("Basketball, however, does not enjoy exemption from the antitrust laws."); Robertson v.
NBA, 389 F. Supp. 867, 880 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("[P]rofessional basketball is subject to
federal antitrust regulation.").
101. See, e.g., Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc.,
351 F. Supp. 462, 481-86, 506-07 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
102. See Deesen v. Professional Golfers' Ass'n of Am., 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1966).
103. See California Clippers, Inc. v. United States Soccer Football Ass'n, 314 F. Supp.
1057 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
104. See Amateur Softball Ass'n of Am. v. United States, 467 F.2d 312, 314 (10th Cir.
1972) ("We can only conclude that amateur softball is not presently entitled to rely on the
same unique exemption that organized professional baseball has claimed and achieved for
so many years.").
105. See, e.g., Mackey, 543 F.2d at 606.
106. See, e.g., Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Kapp v.
NFL, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
441 U.S. 907 (1979).
107. See, e.g., BrownII, 116 S. Ct. at 2116.
108. See Mike Kiley, Rozelle Won't Intervene-Yet, CHI. TRm., Sep. 9, 1987, at C3.
109. The "Rozelle Rule" operated as follows:
• Team A loses a free agent to Team B.
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combination and conspiracy in restraint of trade denying professional
football players the right to freely contract for their services.""'
The trial court found the Rozelle Rule illegal under both a per se
analysis and a Rule of Reason analysis."' The Eighth Circuit reversed the
trial court's finding that the Rozelle Rule was a group boycott and
therefore per se illegal, but affirmed the court's alternate finding that the
Rozelle Rule violated the Rule of Reason."' Because of the non-
conventional nature of the parties involved, the circuit court felt that Rule
of Reason scrutiny was the more appropriate method of analysis."3 Thus,
the court held the Rozelle Rule subject to the Sherman Act because it
benefited from neither the baseball exemption (under Radovich) nor the
non-statutory labor exemption."' However, since the Rozelle Rule did not
receive the benefit of the non-statutory labor exemption (as it was not the
product of good faith bargaining) and because it failed Rule of Reason
scrutiny, the court declared it illegal."5
" Team B owes compensation to Team A.
" Team A and Team B agree to the compensation, which takes the form of a
player or players.
- If no agreement is reached, the Commissioner sets the compensation.
See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 609, n.1.
110. Id. at 609.
111. See id. at 618-20, 621-22.
112. See id. at 609, 622.
113. Rather than applying a per se analysis, the court felt that the distinctive nature of
the NFL and the competition among its participants required an evaluation of the
"purported justifications for the rule." Id. at 619.
114. See infra notes 134-46 and accompanying text. The Eighth Circuit set forth the test
for the non-statutory labor exemption from antitrust liability as a tripartite inquiry:
1)Does the restrictive practice being challenged affect only the parties to the
agreement?
2)Is the restrictive practice a mandatory subject of collective bargaining (under
§ 8(d) of the NLRA, mandatory subjects of bargaining pertain to "wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment .... )?
3)Is the restrictive practice the result of good faith, arm's length bargaining?
If all of the foregoing questions are answered in the affirmative, the practice is exempt from
antitrust scrutiny. See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 615.
115. The Rozelle Rule failed the Rule of Reason analysis because the court could find
no pro-competitive benefits from the practice. See id. at 620-22.
Although the Rozelle Rule was declared a violation of the Sherman Act, it proved less
restrictive to player movement than the subsequent collective bargaining agreement (CBA)
that the NFL and the Players' Association negotiated (under Rozelle, four players moved in
twelve years; under the new CBA, two players moved in thirteen years).
The free agency market in the NFL did not explode until the 1990s, more than fifteen
years after the Eighth Circuit granted it to the players.
19981
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2. The Rookie Draft
In 1976, a NFL player who had suffered a career-ending injury during
his rookie year sued his team and the NFL, claiming that the rookie draft
was a "group boycott" that had operated to deny him the opportunity to
sell his services for their fair value in a truly "free market.".. 6
The D.C. Circuit reversed the trial court's finding that the rookie draft
was a true group boycott and therefore per se illegal, but affirmed the
court's alternate finding that the rookie draft violated the Rule of Reason
because it was "more restrictive than necessary.""' 7 The court found the
rookie draft to be anti-competitive with respect to the market for players'
services, and pro-competitive with respect to league parity; however,
comparing these two effects is similar to comparing proverbial "apples and
oranges." Accordingly, the court held that the pro-competitive effects did
not outweigh the anti-competitive effects; therefore, the draft was illegal.""
Ultimately, the NFL reinstated the draft through collective bargaining."9
3. The Salary Cap
Players challenged the salary cap in the recent Brown v. Pro Football,
Inc.' 2 litigation. The cap was adjudged an illegal restraint of trade by the
trial court, 12' but the Supreme Court ultimately upheld the cap, declaring it
protected by the non-statutory labor exemption."
116. James "Yazoo" Smith, an All-American cornerback from the University of Oregon,
was the Redskins' first round pick (twelfth overall) in the 1968 draft. He signed a one-year
contract for $50,000, but suffered a career-ending neck injury in the final game of the 1968
season. See Smith, 593 F.2d at 1176.
117. Id. at 1175. The NFL rookie draft was not considered a true group boycott subject
to per se nullification because the NFL did not try to stop Smith from competing with them,
as would be the case in a true boycott. See id. at 1179.
118. See id. at 1186-87. Judge MacKinnon dissented from the three-member panel's
decision, claiming that the court's "apples and oranges" analysis was improper because the
competitors in Smith did not fit into the normal antitrust framework, and the draft should be
evaluated globally, not solely from the players' perspective. See id. at 1191-1223
(MacKinnon, J., dissenting). Similar to how it instituted the Rozelle Rule, the league
initially implemented the draft without negotiating it through collective bargaining.
119. The Court appears to say in Smith that if the union acts in its own self-interest and
enters into a collective bargaining agreement, no part of that agreement can violate the
Sherman Act (because under the non-statutory labor exemption, the substance of a
collective bargaining agreement cannot be challenged under the Sherman Act). Having a
draft seems to be in the owners' best interest only, but once the players agree to it, they
have no recourse through the antitrust laws.
120. See supra note 3 and infra notes 189-212 and accompanying text.
121. See infra note 201.
122. See infra notes 134-46 and notes 210-12 and accompanying text.
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II. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING THEORY-BEFORE THE BROWN III
DECISION
If a collectively bargained labor practice can satisfy the Mackey test
and qualify for the non-statutory labor exemption, it remains exempt from
antitrust scrutiny, provided the collective bargaining agreement remains in
effect.'3 There has been much judicial and scholarly disagreement on
when this exemption expires and the practice again becomes subject to
antitrust scrutiny. It is informative to follow the development of the
statutory and non-statutory labor exemptions up to the Brown case to
understand fully the differing schools of thought.
Because the aim of antitrust law is to promote competition and
discourage collective behavior, while the aim of labor law is to use
collective activity to protect the workers' rights, there is a fundamental
tension between antitrust and labor law. In order to reconcile these
differing doctrines, two exemptions to antitrust law were developed: the
statutory labor exemption and the non-statutory labor exemption.
A. The Statutory Labor Exemption
The statutory labor exemption, grounded in the Clayton Act 24 and in
123. See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 615. See also supra note 114.
124. Section 6 provides:
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce.
Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the
existence and operation of labor... organizations, instituted for the purposes of
mutual help, and not having capital stock or conducted for profit, or to forbid or
restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out
the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members
thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in
restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws.
15 U.S.C. § 17 (1996).
Section 20 provides:
No restraining order or injunction shall be granted... in any case between an
employer and employees ... involving, or growing out of, a dispute concerning
terms or conditions of employment, unless necessary to prevent irreparable
injury to property .... And no such restraining order or injunction shall
prohibit any person or persons, whether singly or in concert, from terminating
any relation of employment, or from ceasing to perform any work or labor, or
from recommending, advising, or persuading others by peaceful means so to
do... or from doing any act or thing which might lawfully be done in the
absence of such dispute by any party thereto; nor shall any of the acts specified
in this paragraph be considered or held to be violations of any law of the United
States.
29 U.S.C. § 52 (1996).
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the Norris-LaGuardia Act,'2" was established in the wake of public protest
over the applicability of the Sherman Act to union activities in the
"Danbury Hat" case. 26 Enacted in 1914, the Clayton Act prescribed that
human labor was not interstate commerce, and therefore, was not within
the purview of the Sherman Act.'27 Even after the Clayton Act, however,
many unions lost antitrust cases brought against them due to the courts'
interpretation of certain ambiguous language in the Act.'2
In 1932, Congress reacted to this line of judicial interpretation by
enacting the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which limited the jurisdiction of courts
in labor cases by denying courts the power to issue restraining orders and
injunctions in cases arising out of labor disputes.'29 Congress further
125. Norris-LaGuardia Act, ch. 90, § 1, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (current version at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 101-10, 113-15 (1996)).
126. See Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 308-09 (1908). In Loewe (popularly known as
the "Danbury Hat" case) an employer sued a hat makers' union, claiming that their group
boycott of non-union goods was a § 1 Sherman Act violation. The Court agreed, finding
that the group boycott was a conspiracy in violation of the antitrust laws, and awarded
damages of $240,000. See id.
127. Interestingly, this rationale is quite similar to Justice Holmes' opinion in Federal
Baseball, where the Court found that baseball was not interstate commerce. However,
Holmes chose to focus on the interstate character of baseball, rather than the labor aspect.
See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
128. See, e.g., Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921). In Duplex
Printing, the Court held that a union's boycott for organizational purposes was a Sherman
Act violation. See id. at 478. The Court stated that § 6 of the Clayton Act does not grant
unions immunity from antitrust liability when unions depart from "normal and legitimate
objects." Id. at 469. The Court further held that § 20 of the Clayton Act applied only to
controversies between employers and their employees, not to strangers' picketing activities.
See id. at 472-73.
129. Section 4 of the Act enumerates the following protected union activities, for which
courts are denied injunctive jurisdiction:
(a)Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of
employment;
(b)Becoming or remaining a member of any labor organization or of any
employer organization, regardless of any such undertaking or promise as is
described in [29 U.S.C. § 103];
(c)Paying or giving to, or withholding from, any person participating or
interested in such labor dispute, any strike or unemployment benefits or
insurance, or other moneys or things of value;
(d)By all lawful means aiding any person participating or interested in any
labor dispute who is being proceeded against in, or is prosecuting, any action or
suit in any court of the United States or of any State;
(e)Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in, any labor
dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling, or by any other method
not involving fraud or violence;
(f)Assembling peaceably to act or to organize to act in promotion of their
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buttressed these union protections by enacting the National Labor
Relations Act [NLRA], 30 which provides that the legal protection of
employees' rights to unionize and to bargain collectively promotes
commerce in the country." '
Courts gave substance to the protections that Congress afforded
workers in these legislative pronouncements by upholding their underlying
principles. In United States v. Hutcheson,12 the Supreme Court construed
the Clayton Act to grant an antitrust exemption to employees who were
participating in union-related activities.' However, the courts were
interests in a labor dispute;
(g)Advising or notifying any person of an intention to do any of the acts
heretofore specified;
(h)Agreeing with other persons to do or not to do any of the acts heretofore
specified; and
(i)Advising, urging, or otherwise causing or inducing without fraud or violence
the acts heretofore specified, regardless of any such undertaking or promise as
described in [29 U.S.C. § 103].
29 U.S.C. § 104 (1996).
130. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended,
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1996). The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) was enacted
through the 1935 Wagner Act, and was amended through the 1948 Taft-Hartley Act.
131. See id. § 151. Section 1 of the NLRA further provides the following endorsement
of collective activity:
It is declared hereby to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes
of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate
and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the
practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise
by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of
representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms
and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1996).
132. 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
133. The court in Hutcheson stated:
So long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine with non-labor
groups, the licit and the illicit under § 20 [of the Clayton Act] are not to be
distinguished by any [judicial] judgment regarding the wisdom.., the
rightness... [or the] selfishness... of the end of which the particular union
activities are the means.
Id. at 232.
Hutcheson was a criminal prosecution that charged members of a carpenters' union
with illegal strikes, picketing, and consumer leafleting in a jurisdictional dispute with a
machinists' union. See id. at 228. Justice Frankfurter held that the exemption of specific
union activities from the court's equitable powers must imply a similar exemption from
criminal liability. See id. at 234-35.
However, in subsequent cases, the Supreme Court held that the NLRA does not grant
unions immunity against unfair labor practice charges. See, e.g., National Licorice Co. v.
1998)
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unwilling to grant collective bargaining agreements the same blanket
antitrust exemption that the Norris-LaGuardia Act guarantees to strikes
and lockouts.
B. The Non-Statutory Labor Exemption
Although the statutory labor exemption only applies to specific union
activities, as enumerated under the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts,
the courts have developed a non-statutory labor exemption to insulate
certain employer-employee agreements. Courts determine the scope of
this exemption by balancing the competing policies behind labor laws and
antitrust laws.' 4 Because the exemption requires a balancing of the
equities, there has been much dispute over the term of the exemption:
whether the mere presence of a collective bargaining relationship
perpetually protects all of the employer's activities from antitrust scrutiny,
or whether there is a point in time (after the parties reach an impasse in the
collective bargaining process) when the non-statutory exemption ends.
1. History of the Non-Statutory Exemption
The non-statutory exemption has applied only to union activity
undertaken alone, or activity that affects only those involved in the
collective bargaining process. The Supreme Court has denied the
applicability of the non-statutory labor exemption to collectively bargained
agreements that involve or impact groups that are not a party to the
specific agreement,'35 yet has applied the exemption when the agreement
affects only the parties to it and is the result of good-faith, arm's length
NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 369 (1940).
134. See Lee Goldman, The Labor Exemption to the Antitrust Laws as Applied to
Employers' Labor Market Restraints in Sports and Non-sports Markets, 1989 UTAH L. REV.
617, 649 (1989) (addressing the tension between antitrust and labor policies when antitrust
laws are applied to an employer's restraints).
135. See, e.g., Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local Union No. 100,
421 U.S. 616, 626 (1975) ("The federal policy favoring collective bargaining therefore can
offer no shelter for the union's coercive action against Connell or its campaign to exclude
nonunion firms from the subcontracting market."); United Mine Workers of America v.
Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 665-66 (1965) ("But we think a union forfeits its exemption
from the antitrust laws when it is clearly shown that it has agreed with one set of employers
to impose a certain wage scale on other bargaining units. One group of employers may not
conspire to eliminate competitors from the industry and the union is liable with the
employers if it becomes a party to the conspiracy."); Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union
No. 3, 325 U.S. 797, 808 (1945) ("Congress never intended that unions could, consistently
with the Sherman Act, aid non-labor groups to create business monopolies and to control
the marketing of goods and services.").
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bargaining.
136
2. Applying the Mackey Test and the Non-Statutory Exemption -
McCourt v. Los Angeles Kings
In the Mackey case," the court developed a three part test to
determine whether a restrictive labor practice is exempt from antitrust
liability under the non-statutory labor exemption. The court held that three
elements were required for the exemption to apply: the restrictive practice
(a) must affect only the parties to the agreement, (b) must be a mandatory
subject of collective bargaining, and (c) must be the result of good-faith,
arm's length bargaining.
38
One of the first sports cases to apply the non-statutory labor
exemption and the Mackey test involved the NHL's player compensation
rule, By-Law 9A. 39 The NHL and the National Hockey League Players'
Association [NHLPA] discussed the rule briefly during collective
bargaining in 1973-1975.4 Although the two sides did not agree on the
rule, the adoption of the 1976 collective bargaining agreement purported to
ratify the NHL By-Laws, including By-Law 9A.
In 1978, a player who had been awarded to another team as
"compensation" under By-Law 9A sued the NHL, claiming that this
"reserve system" violated the Sherman Act.'4' The trial court agreed,
refusing to afford By-Law 9A the benefit of the non-statutory labor
exemption from the antitrust laws because the NHL initially did not
implement the rule as the result of a good-faith, arm's length collective
bargaining agreement.'42  The court further found By-Law 9A to be an
136. See Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S.
676, 689-90 (1965). Local 189 insisted on a provision in the collective bargaining
agreement that restricted butchers' daytime hours. The clause was held to be protected
from antitrust scrutiny by the labor exemption because it was the subject of good-faith,
arm's length bargaining that did not involve non-union groups. See id.
See also Goldman, supra note 134, at 650-53 (describing the origin of the non-
statutory exemption in Jewel Tea and Pennington).
137. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
138. See id., 543 F.2d at 615; see also supra note 114.
139. By-Law 9A, which the NHL unilaterally implemented in 1973, was similar to the
NFL's Rozelle Rule-if an unsigned player transferred to a new team, the old team was
entitled to compensation, in the form of players, from his new team. If the teams involved
could not agree to the compensation, it would be determined by an impartial arbitrator
selected by the NHL Board of Governors. See McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d
1193, 1195 (6th Cir. 1979), vacating 460 F. Supp. 904 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
140. See McCourt, 460 F. Supp. at 910-11.
141. See McCourt, 600 F.2d at 1195. In 1978, Detroit signed the Los Angeles Kings'
free agent goaltender, Rogatien Vachon, and the league's arbitrator awarded Los Angeles
an "equalization payment" in the form of Detroit's forward Dale McCourt. See id. at 1196.
142. See McCourt, 460 F. Supp. at 909-12.
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unreasonable restraint of trade, and thus illegal under the Sherman Act.1
43
The Sixth Circuit, however, overturned the trial court, holding that
By-Law 9A was a fair and reasonable condition of employment, and, as it
was part of the collective bargaining agreement, it enjoyed the protection
of the non-statutory labor exemption.44 The court also noted that although
the reserve clause was not an advantageous practice from the players'
perspective, the players and owners had ratified it through a collectively-
bargained agreement. Therefore, the reserve clause qualified for the non-
statutory exemption. 45  The Sixth Circuit distinguished between the
unilateral imposition of a restrictive practice and the superior negotiating
talent of a bargaining party, stating that "nothing in the labor law compels
either party negotiating over mandatory subjects of collective bargaining
to yield on its initial bargaining position. Good faith bargaining is all that
is required."' 46
McCourt was a landmark case for the non-statutory exemption,
because it expanded Mackey to cover all components of a collective
bargaining agreement, even clearly one-sided terms. Collectively
bargained terms cannot be viewed in a vacuum, but must be evaluated in
the larger context of the entire agreement. In McCourt, the NHLPA had to
concede to By-Law 9A, but in exchange, the union received many
concessions from the owners.' The continuing value of McCourt is the
negotiating tenet that hard-line bargaining will not expose the terms of a
collectively bargained agreement to antitrust liability, even if the assailed
terms do not benefit the employees.
C. The Evolution of the Expiration Standard for the Non-Statutory Labor
Exemption
The non-statutory exemption was not implicated heavily in the sports
industry until the late 1980s. However, between 1987 and 1989, five
major district and circuit court decisions began to shape the standard for
the expiration of the non-statutory exemption. The path towards Brown
was initiated by a basketball player named Leon Wood. Wood was the
Philadelphia 76ers' first round draft pick in 1984, but under the NBA's
collectively-bargained salary cap, the team could only offer him a salary of
$75,000. Wood sued the league, claiming that subjecting a non-union
143. See id. at 912.
144. See McCourt, 600 F.2d at 1200.
145. See id.
146. Id.
147. One such concession that the players received was the dissolution of the collective
bargaining agreement in the event that the NHL and the World Hockey Association merged.
See id. at 1202.
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member to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement was a violation
of the Sherman Act.4 '
Judge Winter,'49 writing for the Second Circuit, rejected Wood's
antitrust arguments as a "wholesale subversion of [federal labor] policy."'50
The court held that Wood and other players entering the NBA were subject
to the NBA's collective bargaining agreement. Rookie players are subject
to the NBA's labor agreement, just as an apprentice electrician is subject
to the terms of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers union's
collectively bargained agreements upon admission to that union. Unions
involved in collective bargaining properly negotiate on behalf of all
present and future members to ensure that all union members who work
under the terms of such agreements are treated fairly.''
During 1987, the NBA collective bargaining agreement expired.
Once the owners and players had negotiated to an impasse 52 the National
Basketball Players' Association (NBPA) brought an antitrust suit in federal
court, 1 53 claiming that the rookie draft, the right of first refusal, and the
148. See Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954, 960 (2d Cir. 1987). Wood argued that the NBA
salary cap, similar to the NFL salary cap that the Smith court declared an antitrust violation,
unfairly prevented him from receiving the true market value for his services. See id. at 959.
149. See id. at 956. Judge Winter, widely viewed as one of the country's more pro-
management jurists, is a strong proponent of the theory that once a group of professionals
unionizes, they perpetually waive their right to antitrust recourse. See, e.g., Michael Jacobs
& Ralph Winter, Antitrust Principles and Collective Bargaining by Athletes: Of Superstars
in Peonage, 81 YALE L.J. 1 (1971). Judge Winter also subscribes to the belief that labor
law is always superior to antitrust law. See Wood, 809 F.2d at 959 ("[No] one seriously
contends that the antitrust laws may be used to subvert fundamental principles of our
federal labor policy.").
150. Id.
151. Wood does not involve an expired collective bargaining agreement, but it is
instructive in that it shows the court's attitude toward persons outside an effective collective
bargaining agreement. Scholars often view Wood as the starting point from which the
current Brown III standard evolved. See PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS AND
THELAw 181 (1993).
152. "Impasse" occurs when the parties to collective bargaining "have exhausted the
prospects of concluding an agreement and further discussions would be fruitless." Laborers
Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Advanced Lightweight Concrete Co., Inc., 484 U.S. 539,
544 n.5 (1988). In applying the standard, courts and the NLRB look to:
such factors as the number of meetings between the parties, the length of those
meetings, "the importance of the issue or issues as to which there is
disagreement, the contemporaneous understanding of the parties as to the state
of negotiations" and the period of time that has transpired between the start and
breaking off of negotiations. Impasse, "in almost all cases, is eventually broken
through either a change of mind or the application of economic force."
Goldman, supra note 134, at 663 n.232 (citations omitted).
153. See Bridgeman v. NBA, 675 F. Supp. 960, 961 (D.N.J. 1987). When the NBA was
in bad financial shape in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the players agreed to a salary cap
that was set at a specified percentage of total league revenues. When the league recovered,
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salary cap all violated the Sherman Act."5 The players and the owners
both presented proposals to the court for the expiration of the non-statutory
labor exemption. The players argued that at the instant that the agreement
expires, the exemption should expire [hereinafter Instant], or in the
alternative, that once "impasse"'53 has been reached in the negotiations, the
exemption should expire [hereinafter Impasse]. The court rejected both of
these expiration points as improper.'56 The court, however, also rejected
the owners' suggestion that there should be a perpetual exemption for
parties involved in a collective bargaining relationship, as long as the
employer maintains the "status quo by not imposing any new restraints"
[hereinafter Perpetual].' 57
Instead, the court constructed the "employer's reasonable belief'
standard [hereinafter ERB], holding that the exemption continues with
respect to a specific restraint "as long as the employer continues to impose
that restriction unchanged, and reasonably believes that the practice or a
close variant of it will be incorporated in the next collective bargaining
through the success of star players such as Magic Johnson, Larry Bird, and the young
Michael Jordan, the players wanted the salary cap lifted in order to increase the level of
player salaries.
The NBPA was aware of Judge Winter's attitudes against antitrust as a proper remedy
for labor participants. See supra note 149 and accompanying text. Accordingly, the NBPA
filed suit in New Jersey (part of the Third Circuit), thereby ensuring that the case could not
be appealed to Judge Winter of the Second Circuit.
154. Although Smith and Mackey had invalidated the NFL's rookie draft and right of
first refusal, respectively, those cases did not control here. Both of those cases involved
restrictive practices that were unilaterally imposed by the league, while in Bridgeman, the
assailed practices were included as part of a collectively bargained agreement.
Accordingly, the NBA's practices were exempt from the purview of the antitrust laws by
the non-statutory labor exemption.
Because the collective bargaining agreement between the NBA and the NBPA had
expired, however, the NBPA effectively was challenging the length of time that the non-
statutory labor exemption continued to apply beyond the expiration of the underlying
collective bargaining agreement.
155. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
156. The court rejected the Instant standard on the grounds that it would be a
disincentive to further collective bargaining, which would undermine the federal labor
policy of full and good faith bargaining. There are many instances in the bargaining history
of the NBA and the NBPA where collective bargaining negotiations stopped and restarted,
although both sides continued to implement the terms of the recently expired agreement.
See Bridgeman, 675 F. Supp. at 965.
The court also rejected the Impasse standard, explaining that "an impasse is not
equivalent to the end of negotiations, or the loss of hope that any of the practices subject to
negotiation will be incorporated in a new agreement." Id. at 966.
157. Id. The "once a union, always a union" mentality that the NBA supported was not
adopted by the court because such reasoning has the potential to discourage collective
activity. The court feared that adopting such a doctrine would push the union to refrain
from collective activity in order to save their ability to benefit from the antitrust laws.
See id.
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agreement.', 5S The ERB test became the expiration standard until Marvin
Powell brought the first of a series of actions against the NFL in 1987.
After the 1987 National Football League Players' Association
(NFLPA) strike ended and the players returned to work without a contract,
Marvin Powell, the union president, sued the league, claiming that the
NFL's right of first refusal and standard player contract violated the
Sherman Act. 19 The court found that the right of first refusal, based on the
Rozelle Rule that the Mackey court declared illegal, was legal because the
players and owners collectively bargained for it in the 1982 collective
bargaining agreement.' 6 The court then needed to determine when the
non-statutory exemption would expire.
The players proposed that the exemption should expire when the
union makes it "unequivocally clear" that it no longer consents to the
terms of the expired agreement [hereinafter UC].' 6' The owners reiterated
their Bridgeman arguments that the terms of a collectively bargained
agreement should receive perpetual protection as long as no one alters the
terms. The court rejected both arguments, holding that conceptually, the
UC standard was too close to the Instant standard, and that both were
undesirable because they provided disincentives to negotiation.' The
court also held that the Perpetual standard could give too much protection
to illegal provisions that owners gained through the collective bargaining
process.' The court eschewed the ERB standard that the Bridgeman court
158. Id. at 967. The court noted that this test should be applied to each assailed practice
individually, not to the negotiating process as a whole. See id. The court also noted,
however, that ERB was a question of fact, and its resolution "may not be possible until after
the parties have resolved their differences and entered into a new collective bargaining
agreement." Id.
The ERB standard can also be viewed as a disincentive to collective bargaining
because under the test, anything that the union says at the bargaining table could be used
against them should the circumstances and substance of negotiations come under scrutiny.
The union would have to stop bargaining completely before antitrust remedies were
available.
159. See Powell v. NFL, 678 F. Supp. 777 (D. Minn. 1988) [hereinafter "Powell "],
rev'd, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989) [hereinafter "Powell HI"], cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040
(1991). The union, in an attempt to avoid the Second Circuit's Judge Winter, brought the
action in the friendly confines of the Eighth Circuit (home of the arguably pro-union
Mackey decision).
The action challenged the right of first refusal/compensation system and the NFL
Player Contract. The complaint alleged that the NFL unilaterally implemented language in
the standard contract regarding the "waiver system," and that this waiver system violated
antitrust laws. See Powell I, 678 F. Supp. at 779.
160. See id. at 780-81 (outlining execution of the 1982 collective bargaining agreement).
161. See id. at 786. The union contended that they manifested their intention to
withdraw their consent to be bound by the agreement in various ways, including public
statements and a twenty-seven day strike. See id. at 786 & n.17.
162. See id. at 786-87.
163. See id.
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had concocted in favor of the Impasse standard rejected by the Bridgeman
court.' After the NLRB dismissed an outstanding unfair bargaining claim
that the NFL had filed against the NFLPA, the court declared that the
parties were at impasse, and accordingly, that the non-statutory exemption
had expired.' 6s However, the NFLPA failed to meet the equity balancing
test required for the issuance of an injunction under the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, and the judge sent the parties back to the bargaining table.'6
The NFL appealed the district court's adoption of the Impasse
standard to the Eighth Circuit. 67 A divided court rejected the Impasse
standard because "the League and the Players [had] not yet reached the
point in negotiations where it would be appropriate to permit an action
under the Sherman Act."'68 Instead, the court fashioned a new test that
held that the non-statutory exemption expired only at the end of the
collective bargaining relationship [hereinafter CBR].169
D. The Threat of NBPA Decertification
In 1994, immediately before the NBA-NBPA collective bargaining
agreement expired, the NBA pursued a declaratory judgment that its
renewal of the terms of the expiring agreement would not violate antitrust
laws.170 The district court granted the NBA the declaratory judgment and
held that the NBA was entitled to employ a non-statutory exemption
defense.' Judge Duffy, though censuring the NBA for jumping the gun,
164. See id. at 787-88. The court articulated the Impasse test as whether, "following
intense, good faith negotiations, the parties have exhausted the prospects of concluding an
agreement. Impasse is generally synonymous with deadlock: it occurs when the parties
have discussed the matter and, despite their best efforts to achieve agreement, neither is
willing to move from its position." Id at 788 (citation omitted).
165. See Powell v. NFL, 690 F. Supp. 812, 814 (D. Minn. 1988) [hereinafter
"Powell II"].
166. "It would be highly destructive to collective bargaining if major issues could be
removed from the bargaining table and preliminarily resolved in isolated antitrust
litigation," because it would produce disincentives to engage in good-faith bargaining.
Id. at 817.
167. See Powell III, 930 F.2d at 1293.
168. See id. at 1301-02.
169. See id. at 1303. The court stated that as long as an "ongoing collective bargaining
relationship" existed between the players and owners, there should not be a daunting threat
of antitrust liability that drives the parties away from the bargaining table. The dissent
feared that this new standard would require the NFLPA to decertify in order to retain the
"leverage" of the antitrust laws, which the players soon undertook. See id. at 1309-10.
170. See NBA v. Williams, 857 F. Supp. 1069 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff'd, 45 F.3d 684
(2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2546 (1996). Critics argue that the League took
such preemptive action to ensure that the matter would be in front of Judge Winter on
appeal. See supra notes 149, 153, 159 and accompanying text.
171. See Williams, 857 F. Supp. at 1078.
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found that the Eighth Circuit's CBR standard was the "only rational
course" to follow when determining the proper expiration point for the
exemption."' Cognizant of Judge Winter's pro-management views on this
topic, and fully aware that he might be involved in any appeal to the
Second Circuit, the NBPA nonetheless appealed the judgment. 73 Not
surprisingly, Judge Winter agreed with the lower court's interpretation of
the standard and affirmed the judgment. 4
In response to the court's ruling, several notable players, including
superstars Michael Jordan and Patrick Ewing, pushed for union
decertification in order to pursue antitrust remedies against the NBA.'75
Collective bargaining produced a new labor agreement, and the NBPA
chose to ratify the agreement rather than to decertify.
176
Ill. NFLPA DECERTIFICATION
In 1989, in response to the opinions in Powell III, the NFLPA
renounced its status as the collective bargaining agent for the NFL
players.'n The union adopted "trade association" status without an official
NLRB decertification, but, accordingly, was unable to handle collective
bargaining or grievance matters on behalf of the players.7 7 Although this
"decertification" movement allowed a small number of players to recover
for the league's violation of antitrust laws, the players and owners
172. See id.
173. It should not be inferred that the NBPA had any choice but to appeal the judgment
against them to the Second Circuit. However, as Judge Winter had been so outspoken on
the topic, it comes as no surprise that he affirmed the lower court.
174. See Williams, 45 F.3d at 693. Judge Winter affirmed Judge Duffy's use of the CBR
standard, but further analyzed the issue in terms of multi-employer bargaining conduct.
Noting that Congress has indicated its approval of multi-employer bargaining in the past,
the court failed to find evidence of multi-employer bargaining being adjudged illegal
merely because a collectively bargained agreement expired and the multi-employer unit
continued to act accordingly. See id. at 690. The court held that absent Congressional
action to the contrary, multi-employer bargaining must be presumed to be legal. See id. at
691-93.
175. See Blythe A. Holden, Tilting the Table: Collective Bargaining After National
Basketball Ass'n v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1995), 19 HARV. J.L. & PUn. POL'Y 228,
233 n.30 (1995); Greg Boeck, Jordan and Others Want 'Fair Share', USA TODAY, Jun. 29,
1995, at 10C; Jordan, 6 Players Sue NBA, Cm. TRm., Jun. 29, 1995, at 4. The group of
seven players filed suit in federal court in Minnesota, alleging several antitrust violations.
See Boeck, supra at 10C. Ironically, Ewing was later elected president of the NBPA.
176. The union voted 226 to 134 not to decertify. See Laura Mirabito, Picking Players
in the College Draft Could be Picking Trouble with Antitrust Law, 36 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 823, 825 (1996); Roger Thurow, NBA Union Begins Lobbying Players for Acceptance
of Its Last-Minute Deal, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 1995, at B1.
177. See Len Pasquarelli, Falcons Notebook, ATLANTA CONST., Dec. 7, 1989, at H3.
178. See WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 151, at 199.
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continued to push for courts to change their interpretations of the
expiration standard.
179
A. Powell III's Certiorari Petition
The players in Powell III petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari,
and the Court solicited briefs from, among others, the NLRB (for a labor
law perspective) and the Solicitor General (for an antitrust law
perspective). The Solicitor General proposed a new standard for
expiration:'8° that the non-statutory exemption continues until the employer
can determine the existence of "real impasse" through the advice of
counsel [hereinafter Impasse Plus], at which point the employer may
implement new conditions, which must satisfy a Rule of Reason
analysis.' The Court, however, never ruled on this proposal, as it denied
certiorari."
B. Plan B Free Agency and NFLPA Decertification
Aware after Powell I and Powell I that any unilaterally implemented
free agency plan would be subject to Rule of Reason antitrust scrutiny, the
NFL implemented Plan B free agency, which provided that each team
could freeze seventy-five percent of its roster, leaving the remaining
players as unrestricted free agents, whom other teams could sign without
owing any compensation.
Having "decertified" as a union (implied in Powell III as the manner
through which the NFLPA could obtain access to the antitrust laws) and
having terminated the collective bargaining relationship with the NFL," a
group of players sued the League, challenging the antitrust validity of Plan
B free agency.' 85 The League claimed that this form of decertification was
179. See infra notes 189-203 and accompanying text.
180. "Recommendations of the Solicitor General usually are given substantial weight by
the Supreme Court, especially when they are requested by the court, as they were in [this]
case." Dave Mackall, NFL Free Agency to Supreme Court?, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1990,
at D2.
181. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 17, Powel v. National Football
League, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991) (No. 89-1421).
182. See Powell, 498 U.S. at 1040 (1991).
183. Plan B allowed each team to reserve thirty-seven players. Many of the unfrozen
players had high salaries or marginal or declining talent. However, the system did expand
free agency-in the twenty-four years prior to Plan B, six players had changed teams, in the
first three years of the system, over 550 players moved.
184. See Neil K. Roman, Illegal Procedure: The National Football League Players
Union's Improper Use of Antitrust Litigation for Purposes of Collective Bargaining,
67 DENy. U. L. REv. 111, 116-17, 123-24 (1990).
185. See Powell v. NFL, 764 F. Supp. 1351 (D. Minn. 1991) [hereinafter "Powell IV"].
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ineffective, because the NFLPA did not have a vote en masse; accordingly,
the League argued, the collective bargaining relationship still existed, and
the non-statutory exemption still applied. 6 The court refused to fault the
union for the form of its decertification, but rather looked to its substance,
holding that the NFLPA's informal decertification was an effective
termination of the collective bargaining relationship between the parties.'8
In a subsequent case, the court held that Plan B failed Rule of Reason
scrutiny, and returned a verdict of $540,000 for four affected players."'
C. The Practice Squad Player Salary Cap - Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.
Before the NFLPA's decertification, the NFL's Long Range Planning/
Finance Committee adopted a resolution that provided that each team carry
a practice squad of six players, and that a weekly salary cap for these
Freeman McNeil initially brought the suit in New Jersey (attempting to escape the appellate
courts of Judge Winter and Judge Gibson), but Powell moved to have the actions joined and
heard in Minnesota federal court.
186. See id. at 1354-55.
187. See id. at 1358.
188. Although eight players were named plaintiffs, the court found that only four of
them had suffered harm from Plan B. See McNeil v. NFL, 1992 WL 315292 (D. Minn.
1992); Mitch Truelock, Free Agency in the NFL: Evolution or Revolution?, 47 SMU L.
REv. 1917, 1944 (1994). When the next year's class of free agents brought a similar class
action suit that had the potential to expose the NFL to over $200 million in damages, the
NFL and the players reached a settlement. See White v. NFL, 822 F. Supp. 1389, 1394
(D. Minn. 1993), aff'd, 41 F.3d 402 (8th Cir. 1994); Truelock, supra at 1944-45. Once the
NFLPA re-certified as the players' collective bargaining agent, the settlement served as the
new collective bargaining agreement. Some of the terms of that agreement that deal with
free agency include the following:
(a)Players are entitled to free agency after five years of service, but the club can
designate a player as a "franchise player." If a franchise player is offered a
contract by a second team, the player's prior team may match the offer;
(b)The rookie draft is reduced to seven rounds;
(c)A salary cap will be imposed if overall salaries reach a set level of league
revenues;
(d)If a salary cap is imposed, free agency is effective after a player has four
years of service;
(e)Teams losing free agents receive compensation in the form of extra draft
picks; and
(f)The parties do not waive their respective rights to bring antitrust suits when
the collective bargaining agreement expires, and the parties agree that the non-
statutory labor exemption to antitrust liability applies until the settlement ends
(cannot sue for antitrust violations after impasse only, etc.).
See WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 151, at 204.
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players be fixed at $1,000 per player."9 NFLPA Executive Chief Gene
Upshaw informed NFL Management Council member Jack Donlan that
the owners and players should collectively bargain that issue. 9' Donlan
declared that the parties were at "impasse" over the issue, and the NFL
implemented the proposal.' 9' Antony Brown and the other practice squad
players brought a class action suit against the NFL, claiming that the
practice player salary cap violated the Sherman Act.'92
The NFL answered the suit by arguing that the non-statutory labor
exemption shielded the League's actions from antitrust liability.' 93 Judge
Lamberth offered three alternate expiration points for the non-statutory
exemption. Initially, the court suggested adoption of the Instant standard
that the Wood court rejected. 94 For four years, "by continuing to hold [the]
parties to the terms of the expired collective bargaining agreement, courts
[were] treating the parties as if they had a current agreement ....
Unfortunately, the nonstatutory labor exemption actually provide[d] a
disincentive for the NFL to sign a new collective bargaining agreement.'
195
The court felt that this was contrary to the purpose of the exemption,
which is to foster a "non-coercive environment that is conducive to serious
negotiations on a new contract."'19 6 Accordingly, the NFL's exemption
defense failed.
Next, the court suggested that the exemption did not extend beyond
Impasse as defined in Powell L'197 As Donlan had declared impasse on the
practice player salary cap issue, 9' this theory also denied the NFL access
to the non-statutory exemption defense.
The court raised a final concern. The non-statutory labor exemption
should be read only to protect terms of employment that were "part of the
expired collective bargaining agreement," because to hold otherwise would
frustrate "the normal operation of the collective bargaining process and
[would give] employers an unfair advantage over unions by enabling
employers to implement, without risk of antitrust liability, restraints to
which the union has never agreed or no longer agrees."'' 9 The court read
the non-statutory exemption as providing protection for the terms of an
expired agreement, not for terms that were never in the agreement, since
189. See Brown I, 782 F. Supp. at 127.




194. See id. at 130-34.
195. Id. at 131.
196. Id. at 130 (quoting Laborers Health & Welfare Trust Fund, 484 U.S. at 544 n.5).
197. See Brown I, 782 F. Supp. at 134.
198. See supra notes 190-91 and accompanying text.
199. Brown 1, 782 F. Supp. at 137.
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doing so would be a disincentive for either side to bargain in good faith.m
Accordingly, under all three of the court's analyses, the NFL could not use
the non-statutory labor exemption as a defense to the antitrust challenge.0 '
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit Court discarded the Brown I court's three
exemption expiration suggestions. Judge Edwards, writing for a divided
court, agreed with the Second and Eighth Circuits' recent opinions
adopting the CBR standard for the expiration of the non-statutory
exemption.20 The players appealed to the Supreme Court and, although
the circuits seemed to agree that the proper expiration standard was the
CBR test, the Court granted certiorari.'
IV. THE SUPREME COURT DID NOT MATERIALLY CHANGE THE
EXPIRATION STANDARD iN BROWN III
By granting certiorari, the Supreme Court committed itself to
addressing the expiration of the non-statutory labor exemption as it applied
to the sports industry for the first time. This landmark case presented a hot
topic for legal commentators.
Some scholars argued that the non-statutory labor exemption should
not apply to the facts of Brown III because "that immunity is premised on
a labor market/product market distinction" that did not apply to the Brown
plaintiffs' claim.0 4 As long as the players represented in the Brown case
chose to have union protection, they should have foregone the protection
of the antitrust laws because the interests that the plaintiffs were
attempting to protect (their interests in the labor market) are the same
interests that the non-statutory exemption was designed to shield from
antitrust liability.2°5 Additionally, some commentators suggested that a
ruling for the union would have disastrous effects on multi-employer
200. See id. at 129-30. Employers would be hesitant to bargain because it would impede
implementation of their proposals. If no bargaining occurred, the employers would be able
to implement new terms without the specter of impending antitrust liability.
Unions also would be hesitant to bargain because the existence of a collective
bargaining relationship would insulate the employer from liability. The only way around
this would be to not enter into collective bargaining from the inception of the relationship.
Surely, these results contradict federal labor policy.
201. At trial, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs, awarding them damages of
$10,000,000, which were trebled under the Sherman Act.
202. See Brown 11, 50 F.3d at 1057-58. The dissent correctly argued that the majority's
finding was overbroad, as it utilized labor law to immunize a restraint implemented outside
of the collective bargaining process. Id. at 1058-59.
203. See Brown v. Pro Football, 116 S. Ct. 593 (1995). The D.C. (Brown), Second
(Williams) and Eighth (Powell IV) Circuits all had adopted the "CBR" standard for
expiration, but the Third (Bridgeman) and Sixth (McCourt) Circuits had yet to adopt it.
204. Doug Leslie, Brown v. Pro Football, 82 VA. L. REV. 629, 630 (1996).
205. See id. at 639-41.
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bargaining outside the sports context.206
Other commentators raised several issues for the Supreme Court to
consider, including whether courts should afford multi-employer
bargaining any preferential treatment under the labor laws, whether
employers with monopsony power 7 should be treated differently than
those without it, and whether the Brown III holding should be limited to
the sports industry.Y'
Ultimately, the Court answered these concerns by promulgating a new
expiration standard, commonly called the "Sufficiently Distant" standard
[hereinafter SD].7 However, analysis of the Court's opinion suggests that
this new standard is materially similar to the CBR standard adopted in
Powell III, Williams, and Brown I.
A. The Supreme Court's Holding in Brown I
The Court in Brown III rejected the players' request for a sports-
related exemption from the non-statutory labor exemption,210 as the
majority could find no legitimate manner in which to distinguish the sports
collective bargaining relationship from any other industry collective
bargaining relationship.211 In addition, the Court established the SD
206. Effectively, a ruling for the union would deny multi-employer bargaining units the
ability, under the NLRA, to implement terms after impasse was reached. See id. at 645; see
also Williams, 45 F.3d at 684.
207. Monopsony is defined as a market condition in which there is a single buyer for a
particular commodity. See BLACK'S LAwDICTIONARY 1007 (6th ed. 1990). A single multi-
employer bargaining unit as is present in professional sports thus qualifies as a monopsony.
For a good analysis of monopsony theory and its interaction with the antitrust laws, see
generally ROGER D. BLAIR & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, MONOPsONY 36-44 (1993); RICHARD A.
POSNER& FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, ANIRUST 150 (1981).
208. See, e.g., Michael E. Lowenstein, Magna Carta for Multiemployer Bargaining?
Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 10-SPG ANTITRUST 41(1996).
209. See Brown Il1, 116 S. Ct. at 2127.
210. The players argued that unlike other labor-management relationships, the sports
and entertainment industries deserve different treatment because they are "characterized by
competitive bidding.., for talented employees whose skills are highly differentiated."
Pet'r Br., 1996 WL 19034, at *26, Brown III, 116 S.Ct. 2116 (1996). Collective bargaining
in the sports industry also is unique in that "players' associations have always acted to
preserve the players' ability to negotiate their own individual salaries in a competitive
market." Id. at *33. As well, in more traditional collective bargaining, "post-impasse
implementation of employment terms by employer associations has not elicited significant
antitrust challenges to date... [because] the employees as well as the employers in those
industries accept the legitimacy of common employment terms for all employees."
Id. at *39. However, in the sports industry, "the availability of antitrust remedies has
fostered constructive bargaining settlements between the two sides." Id.
211. See Brown 111, 116 S. Ct. at 2126. The Court, rather sarcastically, did concede that
the sports industry is special when compared to other labor-intensive industries "in terms of,
say, interest, excitement, or concern," but rejected out of hand any attempts to distinguish
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standard by further defining the expiration standard adopted in Brown II,
stating that a court could find that the non-statutory exemption had expired
if "an agreement among employers [was] sufficiently distant in time and in
circumstances from the collective-bargaining process [such] that a rule
permitting antitrust intervention would not significantly interfere with that
process. 21 2
B. Interpretation of the Court's Holding
Deferring to the expert judgment of the NLRB, and without
committing to a definitive articulation of the SD standard, the Court
alluded to a few examples of the standard that would help the parties better
understand the new exemption expiration. Assuredly, the examples
provided in dicta by the Court are instructive for a trial court considering
whether the collective bargaining relationship has deteriorated sufficiently
distant in time and in circumstances such that imposition of antitrust
liability would not interfere with the collective bargaining process.
The Court cited Brown II for the proposition that the exemption
expires upon the "collapse of the collective-bargaining relationship, as
evidenced by decertification of the union., 213 Arguably, this adds no new
criteria to the analysis provided by the D.C. Circuit in Brown IL There,
the circuit court held that in order for employees "to seek the protections
of the Sherman Act, they may forego unionization or even decertify their
unions. 214 Also, certain facts surrounding union activities may provide
probative evidence that the strength of a formerly secure union has eroded,
such as the presence of a significant drop in support for the union "whether
manifested by a decrease in membership or the advent of significant
internal political factions. 215
The Court also implied that an "'extremely long' impasse,
accompanied by 'instability' or 'defunctness' of [the] multi-employer unit,
might justify union withdrawal from group bargaining., 21 6 The NLRB had
occasion to address union withdrawal from multi-employer bargaining in
the El Cerrito Mill case.217 In that case, the Board held that a union or
employer may withdraw from multi-employer bargaining "for any reason
before the date set for negotiations of a successor contract .... [O]nce
the relationship between the owners and players from that of, for instance, mine owners and
miners. Id.
212. Id. at 2127.
213. Id.
214. Brown II, 50 F.3d at 1057.
215. Weistart, supra note 15, at 128-31.
216. Brown III, 116 S. Ct. at 2127 (citing El Cerrito Mill & Lumber Co., 316 N.L.R.B.
1005, 1006-07, 1995 WL 152166, at *3 (1995)).
217. El Cerrito Mill & Lumber Co., 1995 WL 152166, at *3
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negotiations for a new contract have begun, a party may withdraw... only
if there is mutual consent or 'unusual circumstances.' 21 8  The
determination of "unusual circumstances" is usually left to the judgment of
the Board; but, as a general rule, they are best characterized as "an impasse
of extremely long duration, accompanied by indicia of instability or
defunctness" of the multi-employer unit.
219
The Board's findings with respect to "unusual circumstances" in El
Cerrito Mill is consistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Gissel
Packing.m In Gissel Packing, the Supreme Court supported federal labor
policy favoring collective bargaining by holding that once parties establish
a bargaining relationship, that relationship "must be permitted to exist and
function for a reasonable period in which it can be given a fair chance to
succeed.''2l However, after such time, the NLRB may take appropriate
action in recognition of any real changes to the relationship. This holding
again implies that the termination of the collective bargaining relationship,
after legitimate, concerted attempts at good-faith bargaining, is a question
of fact, but a question that can be answered to the benefit of either party.
C. Applying the Court's Holding
Thus, there are two plausible options for players seeking to gain
access to antitrust protection: (1) decertify or (2) withdraw from the
collective bargaining process before negotiations begin. For example, in a
league like MLS, the players are likely to benefit from the lack of a
collective bargaining relationship because there is no collective bargaining
entity acting on their behalf. Therefore, it seems that MLS players have
ready access to antitrust remedies. If the MLS players do establish a
"trade association" similar to the 1989 status of the NFLPA,m2 they would
qualify under the SD standard articulated in Brown III and still retain
access to the antitrust hammer.
V. THE PARTIES' OPTIONS AT IMPASSE
Once the collective bargaining process reaches impasse, both players
and owners have minimal guidance regarding their options. However, the
218. Id. at *2.
219. Id. at *3. In El Cerrito Mill, a union worked under an extended collective
bargaining agreement for two years while negotiating. Three months before the extension
expired, the parties reached impasse. Six months later, the union attempted to withdraw
from the collective bargaining. The Board explicitly stated that these circumstances do not
qualify for characterization as "unusual circumstances." Id. at *2-3.
220. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
221. Id. at 612-14 (quoting Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702, 705-06 (1944)).
222. See supra Part III.
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choice each party makes is contingent on its respective goals.
A. Owners
At impasse, owners have many different options. Generally, the
appropriate course of action should reflect the owners' evaluation of short-
term and long-term goals. One option is to continue operating under the
terms of the expired agreement.' This choice seeks to preserve the
collective bargaining relationship and is especially desirable where owners
are content with the status quo, and players are not.?1 Another option is to
negotiate a separate interim agreement with the union, where the parties
will agree to be bound only by the terms agreed upon therein. Most likely,
this would occur when the parties disagree on few issues and neither side
wants a work stoppage.
The League may seek to have impasse declared by a district court.
"After impasse, an employer's continued adherence to the status quo is
authorized. At the same time, once an impasse in bargaining is
established, employers become entitled to implement new or different
employment terms that are reasonably contemplated within the scope of
their pre-impasse proposals. ' ' 2s However, the League must analyze the
terms that it implements to ensure that any restrictions survive Rule of
Reason scrutiny.
Owners could also continue negotiating with the players, thus
ensuring that the courts cannot declare impasse. This is an attractive
option if the owners have unilaterally implemented a practice that will not
survive Rule of Reason scrutiny, such as the practice player salary cap in
Brown 1, or if the parties have collectively bargained and agreed to a
restrictive term that would not survive Rule of Reason analysis. If the
parties continue negotiating, the courts will not declare impasse, and
accordingly, the League can avoid the antitrust liability that it might
deserve. However, the League should not choose this option arbitrarily, as
223. The terms of an expired collective bargaining agreement are protected from
antitrust liability to some extent by the non-statutory labor exemption. See supra notes
134-69 and accompanying text.
224. For example, the NFL's owners are satisfied with the League's "hard" salary cap,
while the players would like to repeal it or at the least, increase it.
225. If the League unilaterally implements a practice that is a mandatory subject of
collective bargaining without having impasse declared, it is an unfair labor practice, which
could subject the owners to enormous fines. See Christopher J. Fisher, The 1994-1995
Baseball Strike: A Case Study in Myopic Subconscious Macrocosmic Response to Conflict,
6 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 367, 393 (1996). During MLB's 1994 labor problems, the
owners were threatened with fines of up to $5,000,000 per day in the event that they
committed any unfair labor practices. See id.
226. Powell 11I, 930 F.2d at 1301, (citing Laborers Health & Welfare Trust Fund,
484 U.S. at 544 n.5).
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the "manipulation of impasse in order to avoid antitrust liability is unsound
as a matter of labor and antitrust policy."' ' 7
Finally, owners may lock out the players.'m This choice involves
economics and business integrity: to utilize replacement players or to shut
down operations. In order to make such a decision, the League will need
to balance the short-term financial impact resulting from a lack of games
with the potential long-term effects of producing an inferior product for
the fans and passing it off as the same quality of entertainment and
competition. Hiring replacement players also raises important issues, such
as the potential presence of local labor laws prohibiting the use of
replacement workers when the normal workforce is being locked out,229
and the long-term effects on the game's fan base from passing off such
games as "major league."
B. Players
At impasse, the players' options are somewhat restricted. When
antitrust remedies are not available, such as when owners have use of the
non-statutory labor exemption as a defense, the players may strike, consent
to play under the expired agreement, or, if they are not under contract to a
team, start their own league or jump to another league.no Often, a players'
union will establish a strike fund or purchase strike insurance in order to
protect against lost wages. However, for players who truly "want to play,"
the process of creating a new league leaves few options. Depending upon
the sport, other leagues may be operating that are in the market for the
227. Leslie, supra note 204, at 642 n.43. See also PATRICK HARDIN, THE DEVELOPING
LABOR LAW 696 (Patrick Hardin, et al. eds., 3d ed. 1992).
228. In a lockout, management is responsible for the work stoppage. When management
has locked out the workers, it may either shut down operations or hire replacement workers
and continue operations. See generally David M. Szuchman, Step Up to the Bargaining
Table: A Call for the Unionization of Minor League Baseball, 14 HOFsTRA LAB. L.J. 265,
266 & n.3 (1996).
229. See, e.g., Bill Harris, OLRB Ruling Goes in Favour of Refs, FIN. POST, Nov. 11,
1995, at 90. In 1995, the Ontario Labor Relations Board twice ruled that Ontario labor law
precluded leagues from using replacement referees or umpires in lieu of unionized game
officials, who were on strike at the time. See id. In March 1995, the Maryland General
Assembly passed legislation precluding teams from playing baseball in Oriole Park at
Camden Yards in Baltimore if more than twenty-five percent of their player roster had not
been on major league rosters in 1994. See MD. CODE ANN., FIN. INST. § 13-723(b) (1992 &
Supp. 1995); Peter F. Giamporcaro, No Runs, No Hits, Two Errors: How Maryland Erred
in Prohibiting Replacement Players from Camden Yards During the 1994-95 Major League
Baseball Strike, 17 Loy. L.A. ENT. L.J. 123, 123 (1996).
230. See, e.g., Washington Capitols Basketball Club, Inc. v. Barry, 419 F.2d 472
(9th Cir. 1969) (enjoining Rick Barry from signing a contract to play with the NBA's
San Francisco Warriors while he was under contract with the American Basketball
Association's Washington Capitols).
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players' services.2' However, once a work stoppage occurs and the
players have no antitrust recourse, the players seem to lose on all fronts.
When antitrust remedies are available, however, the players' best
option is to stop the collective bargaining process as soon as possible, or
decertify, so that they satisfy the SD expiration test, thereby gaining access
to the antitrust laws.f 2 The players should undertake this course of action
only if the League's practice fails a Rule of Reason analysis.
VI. WHERE TO GO TO COURT
To date, none of the players' associations have challenged the SD
standard, nor has the Supreme Court articulated further guidelines for its
application2 3 Once the parties realize that court action is inevitable, they
should plan accordingly. Because of the differing attitudes of this
country's jurists and differing precedent among the circuits, parties may
231. Baseball is played in over seventy countries in the world. Currently, there are
professional baseball leagues in Cuba, Italy, and Japan, although the Japanese leagues have
restrictions on the number of foreign players that each team may use. See Bob Rybarczyk,
The IBA and the World Amateur Baseball Movement, 12 NATIONAL PAsTIME 64, 65 (1992).
Professional soccer and basketball leagues exist in most European and South American
countries. Many European countries have professional hockey leagues. Some, along with
Canada, also have professional football leagues. See Kenneth L. Shropshire, Thoughts on
International Professional Sports Leagues and the Application of United States Antitrust
Laws, 67 DENy. U. L. REV. 193, 194-96 (1990).
232. See supra notes 213-22 and accompanying text.
233. As of this writing, only six federal courts and the NLRB have relied on Brown III
in subsequent cases, and in no instance did the jurists quantitatively interpret the SD
standard. See Grinnell Corp. v. Road Sprinkler Fitters Local Union No. 669, 1997 WL
311498, at *11 (D. Md. June 3, 1997) (interpreting Brown III to extend the non-statutory
exemption "where needed to make the collective bargaining process work"). See also
International Paper Co. v. NLRB, 115 F.3d 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (upholding the legality of
implementing terms post-impasse); Chicago Prof I Sports Ltd. Partnership v. NBA, 95 F.3d
593, 599 (7th Cir. 1996) (discussing whether the NBA is a single entity or a joint venture of
entities for purposes of the Sherman Act); Ehredt Underground, Inc. v. Commonwealth
Edison Co., 90 F.3d 238, 241 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that the Brown III court approved the
application of the non-statutory labor exemption to multi-employer bargaining), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 685 (1997); McNealy v. Caterpillar Inc., 1997 WL 7564, at *8-9 (N.D.
M11. Jan. 1, 1997) (holding that the determination of the propriety of post-impasse unilateral
implementation of the employer's final offer is the NLRB's domain, and not the courts');
Sage Realty Corp. v. ISS Cleaning Servs. Group, Inc., 936 F. Supp. 130, 137-38 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (noting that the Brown III court approved the application of the non-statutory labor
exemption to multi-employer bargaining); McClatchy Newspapers, Inc. v. Northern
California Newspaper Guild, 1996 WL 506086, at *10 (N.L.R.B. Aug. 27, 1996) (Cohen,
dissenting) (noting that management's ability to implement post-impasse changes was a
valuable legal tool in collective bargaining, similar to the use of strikes and lockouts),
enforced, 1997 WL 777404 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 19, 1997). Cf. Jefferson v. Milvets Sys. Tech.,
Inc., 1997 WL 739292 (D.D.C. Nov. 25, 1997) (relying on Brown I1's Laffey matrix as a
proxy for reasonable attorneys' fees).
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find certain jurisdictions more advantageous than others. For example,
some venues adopt a middle-of-the-road stance in sports law disputes,
while some courts are likely to be hostile to both parties.
A. Where Players Should Bring an Action
Obviously, players should seek a jurisdiction with a history of
pro-labor decisions. There are a few circuits where judicial precedent
seems to favor players instead of owners. For example, the D.C. Circuit
has ruled in the players' favor before,2 as have the EighthV5 and Ninth
Circuits.ns Because the district and circuit courts will interpret whether the
SD standard has been met, an evaluation of prior judicial interpretation is
quite important to the players.
B. Where Owners Should Bring an Action
All is not lost for the owners as long as Judge Winter is still on the
bench.2" All of the major sports leagues are headquartered in the New
York area, and accordingly, bringing suit in the Second Circuit would be
most convenient.23 The Second Circuit has consistently held in the
owners' favor, based on Judge Winter's premise that unionized workers
perpetually waive their rights to antitrust recourse."
C. Venues Favoring the Collective Bargaining Relationship
Many circuits adopted the CBR standard prior to the Brown III
234. See, e.g., Smith, 573 F.2d at 1173 (holding the NFL rookie draft an illegal restraint
of trade). See also Brown 1, 782 F. Supp. at 125 (offering three different standards for the
expiration of the non-statutory labor exemption, all of which were substantially favorable to
the players).
235. See, e.g., Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp. v. Major League Baseball Players
Assoc., 532 F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1976) (upholding an arbitrator's decision to grant baseball
players free agency).
236. See, e.g., Los Angeles Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.
1984) (denying the NFL the ability to block the Raiders' move from Oaldand to Los
Angeles).
237. See supra notes 149, 153, 159, 170, 185 and accompanying text.
238. The NFL, NBA, and MLB are all based on Park Avenue in New York City, and the
N-L's offices are on Sixth Avenue. MLS has offices in New York City and Secaucus,
New Jersey, which is right across the Hudson River from New York City.
239. See, e.g., Williams, 45 F.3d at 689-92 (adopting the CBR standard, but noting that
after expiration of a collective bargaining agreement, multi-employer conduct is not illegal
merely due to its cooperative nature).
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decision.2 These courts seem to follow labor policy strongly in favor of
collective bargaining. Because of this apparent pro-bargaining stance, it is
likely that the players' association would have to decertify before bringing
any antitrust action in such circuits.
D. Venues Reluctant to Aid Either Party
Several judges in the Seventh Circuit take a different approach to
antitrust issues. These judges, including Judge Easterbrook and Judge
Posner, subscribe to neo-Classical (also known as "Chicago school")
economic antitrust theory. The Chicago school of economic thought is
based on the theory of self-correcting markets.24' Judges Easterbrook and
Posner have claimed that restrictive market practices can be "presumed to
produce efficiencies rather than anticompetitive effects."2 42 This "laissez-
faire" approach would likely result in a holding similar to that in
Bridgeman, namely that the court would refuse to get involved if any
collective bargaining relationship could be imputed.
VII. THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE OF THE LEAGUES' COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING RELATIONSHIPS AND PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE
The following is a brief summary of the major current issues in each
league's labor relationship and the status of the most recently signed
collective bargaining agreement for that league.
A. Major League Baseball
Baseball's owners and players signed a four-year agreement in
December 1996. One of the major sticking points in the negotiations was
whether players who struck in 1994 should be granted credit for working
during that period. Granting those players this "service time" would have
had a direct impact on fourteen players' free agency rights.243 Some of the
major terms of the agreement are as follows:
240. The D.C. Circuit, Second Circuit, and Eighth Circuit all adopted the CBR test. See
supra note 203 and accompanying text. As well, in Bridgeman, the Third Circuit adopted
the ERB test, noting that the resolution of whether the standard was satisfied "may not be
possible until all the parties have resolved their differences and entered a new agreement."
Bridgeman, 675 F. Supp. at 967. In McCourt, the Sixth Circuit refused to invalidate a
unilaterally imposed restriction on player movement because it was ratified through a
subsequent collective bargaining agreement. See McCourt, 600 F.2d at 1193.
241. See Louis Kaplow, Antitrust, Law & Economics, and the Courts, 50 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 181, 192 (1987).
242. Id. (citing Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1984)).
243. See Baseball Gets Peace Until 2000, FLA. TODAY, Dec. 6, 1996, at 1C.
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-The players have the option to extend the deal for a fifth year.
-Any team with a payroll in excess of a preset threshold is taxed,
and the profits go to the league's revenue-sharing program (in
1997, the tax is 35% on amounts over $51 million; in 1998, 35%,
$55 million; in 1999, 34%, $58.9 million; there is no luxury tax.
in 2000 or 2001).
-Minimum salary levels were raised.
-Players and owners agreed jointly to ask Congress to repeal
baseball's antitrust exemption.
244
B. National Basketball Association
After the looming threat of a strike and decertification in the 1995
offseason, the NBA players and owners signed a six-year agreement in
September 1995.245 Some of the major terms of the agreement are as
follows:
-A rookie salary cap fixed salaries at the average salary paid to
the player drafted in that position over the last seven years, with
an allowance for a 20% raise.
-Rookie contracts are limited to three years, after which the
player becomes an unrestricted free agent.
-The salary cap rose from $15.9 million in 1994-95 to
$23 million in 1995-96, with an expected cap of $32.5 million in
2000-01.
-Minimum salaries were increased.
-The "Larry Bird" rule was retained, whereby teams may resign
their own free agent without increasing the salary cap "slot" for
that player, as long as the player has completed a three-year
contract.
-A team may replace an injured player for 50% of that player's
salary.
-Players may extend their current contracts for raises not in
excess of 20%, but large balloon payments are prohibited.
*Teams may not renegotiate a player's contract for a lower
244. See Litke, supra note 76, at 6D.
245. See Chris Sheridan, NBA, Players Union Sign Labor Agreement; Moratorium
Lifted, DALLAS MORNING NEws, July 12, 1996, at iB.
BROWN V. PRO FOOTBALL, INC.
salary.
-After the 1997-98 season, the rookie draft will be dropped from
two rounds to one.2
C. National Football League
After six years without a labor agreement, the NFL and the NFLPA
signed a seven-year labor agreement in 1993.247 Some of the major terms
of the agreement, which was approved by Judge Doty of the Minnesota
District Court, are as follows:
*Players with five years of experience may become unrestricted
free agents.
-Total salaries were guaranteed to equal at least 58% of the
league's gross revenues for each salary cap year.
-The draft was reduced from twelve rounds to seven (plus an
additional round for teams losing free agents).
-Drafted rookies' salaries were capped at approximately
$2 million per club.
-Each team is allowed to designate a "franchise player." Such
players must be offered a contract for the average of the top five
players at that position.246
-The salary cap only runs through the 1999 season, but the
league and the players have the option of extending the deal for
an extra year, making 2001 the first year without the cap.249
D. National Hockey League
The NHL signed a six-year deal in January 1995. The players
escaped the imposition of a salary cap or a luxury tax, but were forced to
accept certain restrictions on free agency and the imposition of a rookie
246. See Scott Howard-Cooper, It's Back to Business for NBA; Pro Basketball: Owners
Approve Collective Bargaining Agreement by a 25-4 Vote. Lockout Will End Monday,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1995, at C1.
247. See NFL Agreement Not Perfect, But a Deal's a Deal: Players, Owners Reach
Accord that Grants Free Agency, S.F. EXAMINER, Jan. 7, 1993, at F5.
248. See id.
249. See Larry Weisman, Meeting Targets the Usual, USA TODAY, Mar. 10, 1997, at 8C
(discussing the main focus of the NFL's winter meeting: labor agreements and ownership
policies).
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salary cap.ri As well, the owners retained the right to walk away from
three arbitration awards over a certain dollar amount within each two-year
period.2' The players had the right to reopen the agreement to new
negotiations in 1998, but the players and owners have waived that right
until 2000.52
E. Major League Soccer
Major League Soccer was incorporated as a single corporation, which
arguably could shield it from certain antitrust liability. As of the start of
the 1997 season, there was no players' union, but the league anticipates
that one will be organized soon.5 3 Even with the lack of a collective
bargaining relationship, MLS has implemented a salary cap, which was
increased from $1.19 million in 1996 to $1.3 million for 1997.24
VI.CONCLUSION
Sports leagues and team owners pay athletes enormous salaries for
playing a kids' game. Although this scenario sounds like a no-lose
situation for the athletes, the leagues often implement policies that
severely restrict the labor market for the athletes through compensation
limits, constraints on player movement, and restrictive player drafts.
Such practices should be subject to challenge under the antitrust laws;
however, the leagues have made use of a judicially constructed labor
exemption to antitrust law to avoid liability. The query that arises most
often in evaluating this labor exemption is how much time passes between
the end of a collective bargaining agreement and the expiration of this
exemption. Many federal trial and appellate courts have addressed this
issue, with no definitive solution in sight.
The Brown v. Pro Football, Inc. decision that the Supreme Court
handed down in 1996 did little to definitively answer the question.
Although the Court's opinion purported to develop a new standard for
expiration of the exemption, an analysis of the opinion shows that Brown
effectively reverted to earlier appellate court precedent, and allowed the
leagues to escape antitrust liability as long as they were involved in
250. See MNKE LUPiCA, MAD AS HELL 162-63 (1996).
251. See Mike Nadel, Players Relent, Save NHL Season, SEATrLE POST-INTELLIGENCER,
Jan. 12, 1995, at D1. Both teams have the right to reopen the agreement in September
1998. See Kevin Allen, Saaaave!, USA TODAY, Jan. 12, 1995, at 1C.
252. See NBA to Lock Out Referees; Accord Has Been Rejected, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Sept.
30, 1995, at C2.
253. See Jerry Langdon, Coaches Have Beef But Training Program Response is
Positive, USA TODAY, Oct. 10, 1996, at 20C.
254. See id.
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ongoing collective bargaining relationships with the players. Accordingly,
players are faced with two unappealing choices: to decertify, as the
NFLPA did in 1989, or to refuse to enter into a collective bargaining
relationship at all, as the MLS players did in their first year. Clearly, these
unappealing options seem to leave the deck stacked in the owners' favor.
